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ABSTRACT 
KIM, SE YOUNG, M.A., June 2010, Film 
A Sociohistorical Contextual Analysis of the Use of Violence in Park Chan-wook's 
Vengeance Trilogy (90 pp.) 
Director of Thesis: Louis-Georges Schwartz 
 This article situates the three films of Park Chan-wook’s, Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance (2002), Oldboy (2003), and Sympathy for Lady Vengeance (2005) within 
recent South Korean history and offers a historicized analysis of the films’ substantial use 
of violence. Through contextual analysis that looks to the films as well as the history and 
society that produced them, this article discovers that the violence is an allegorical tool 
which serves to convey social commentary pointed at the processes of democratization 
and capitalism in South Korea.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In his article on contemporary Korean cinema, Grady Hendrix speaks of 
international perceptions towards the industry as one that combines “art” and 
“exploitation” (18). Filmmaker Park Chan-wook is a key contributor to the creation of 
those perceptions. One of the more successful filmmakers to recently come out of South 
Korea, Park Chan-wook has contributed to the growth and increased global visibility of 
South Korea’s film industry. He is also one of the nation’s most controversial 
filmmakers. In 2004, Park’s Oldboy (2003) won the Grand Prix Award at the Cannes 
Film Festival, a controversial decision that garnered a considerable amount of criticism. 
Hendrix notes that by then, western audiences had already decided on Korean cinema, 
and by the time Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance (Boksuneun naui geot)(2002) received a 
U.S. release, Park was already “a marked man” (18). 
 Why is Park such a polarizing filmmaker? What is it about his films that gains 
him awards yet also invites such criticism as “the violence carries no meaning beyond the 
creator's ego” (Dargis 14)? There is one binding element in Park’s most well known, if 
not notorious work, the Vengeance Trilogy. Graphic violence or ultraviolence is a central 
element in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance, Oldboy, and Sympathy for Lady Vengeance 
(Chinjeolhan geumjassi)(2005). While many in the West may perceive Asian cinema as 
being “extreme” (sensational, egregious, as opposed to just excessive)1, the ultraviolence 
is explicit not only by Western standards but also by Korean standards. 
                                                
1 Grady Hendrix notes that Kim Ki-duk’s The Isle (2000) was “a whole slew of 
misconceptions about Korean movies and violence were cemented in the minds of 
western audiences (18). 
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 Beginning with the assumption that it is the ultraviolence that ties these three 
films together, this thesis asks: why does Park emphasize and explore brutality in his 
films? What functions might it serve for the audience? If this is not gratuitous violence 
“for the sake of violence,” then what is its significance? While violence is the recurring 
motif, it is not presented in the same manner through the course of these films. This is 
where this study originated, with an interest in how the atrocities served different 
narrative functions. However, while there are differences in the actual sequences, the 
films reveal consistent, strong themes – themes reinforced through the different forms of 
brutality. 
 At their core, the films are concerned with issues of gender and class, and in a 
broader context, society and history. The personal struggles for vengeance are allegorical 
for social struggles and this thesis finds that specific anxieties connected to a very 
specific period in recent South Korean history are expressed in the films. Those are 
anxieties formed in the wake of the processes of democratization and capitalization in the 
country. The Vengeance Trilogy is speaking to and speaking of Korea, and through that 
dialogue we can see not only discourses of popular nationalism prominent throughout this 
period, but also a response and resistance to that popular nationalism. 
 
Methodologies and Approach 
For this analysis, I will turn to a number of methodologies. My term 
“ultraviolence” will evoke both a framework of analysis and a descriptive lens. I take my 
lead from an incipient body of work that studies violence in film; a principal scholar of 
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this field is Stephen Prince whose works include Screening Violence (which he edited) 
and Savage Cinema: Sam Peckinpah and the Rise of Ultraviolent Movies. Prince is less 
interested in definitions of ultraviolence than in rethinking the relation between film 
violence, history, and the viewer. He places it within a specific historical context and then 
assigns different attributes to it. For Prince, ultraviolence is the mode of cinema violence 
that appeared in late 1960’s Hollywood films such as Bonnie and Clyde (1967) and The 
Wild Bunch (1969). Several elements facilitated its appearance including the introduction 
of the Motion Picture Association of America’s revised Production Code of America; 
technological advancements in special effects; and rising social consciousness and 
cultural changes related to the Vietnam War and social equality movements. For Prince 
then, ultraviolence is a comparative mode that diverges from cinema violence before its 
emergence. It is not only more graphic and explicit; it is also socially conscious and an 
allegorical mode. Prince is also engaged with the issue of ultraviolence in relation to 
spectatorship, approaching it through a model of historical audience reception, but mostly 
through studies of the psychological effects. In addition, Prince gauges the varying 
responses to film violence in relation to authorial intent: while some critics found the 
films repulsive, many spectators seemed to find the films exhilarating, and both of these 
responses were incongruous with the intent of the directors (Prince, 2000). 
 However, Prince’s work is problematic and will only be referred to as a guideline. 
Prince differentiates between ultraviolent directors and validates some because of their 
pro-social intent (Sam Peckinpah, Martin Scorsese) while dismissing others as indulgent 
and excessive (Quentin Tarantino). For Prince the presence of excessive violence in itself 
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is not significant and worth studying. Instead, it is almost as if certain authors are worth 
analysis in spite of the violence and not because of it. For Prince, the authorial intent is 
much more overt in these filmmakers and this is what separates them from less important 
filmmakers who either have “subtextual” commentary or none at all. It can also be seen 
that the more overtly stylistic filmmakers are decried, and that Prince is insinuating that 
style equals to superficiality. 
 Prince takes authorial intent on a direct basis; he assumes that what the 
filmmakers intended are directly represented onscreen (even though he does acknowledge 
that spectators will have different, “wrong” readings). I contend that the authorial intent 
is not as important as the films’ dialogues with historical audiences and I do not believe 
that authorial intent can be taken so directly. In addition I do not believe that certain 
filmmakers and certain films are more valuable than others. Rather, the use of gratuitous 
violence is significant in itself, because of its inclusion but also because spectators are 
engaging with it. Films do not exist in their own cultural vacuums and all films are in 
dialogue with something. These films reflect the culture, society, and history that 
produced them. My use of authorship in this thesis will differ from Prince’s. I will refer 
to Park by looking at his consistent use of violence and the formal motifs that the films 
share.  
Prince’s use of “social effects” must also be scrutinized. Prince dismisses the idea 
that cinema violence can be cathartic, that aggressive emotions can be purged through the 
act of viewing. Prince argues that while studies on media violence have historically 
offered varying results, the scientific consensus is that catharsis is not a variable effect of 
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viewing violent content. Prince’s use of social effects strays away from a cultural 
approach, looking to scientific data to address the elusive yet always present issue of 
“does violent media create violent behavior?” With the issue of catharsis, Prince is 
criticizing commentators who defend the use of cinema violence on the basis of some sort 
of positive effect. Violence can only be worthy when it exists as social commentary. 
Whether viewing sadistic content can lead to aggressive behavior or not is 
irrelevant to a cultural study; the films will be produced and watched regardless. What is 
relevant is this very phenomenon: the condemnation of certain works in cultures where 
violence is abundant. And whether or not scientists have disproved catharsis, Park 
contends that he is offering catharsis (Macnab). This raises the question: cathartic to 
whom and to what emotions? My answer is that the “catharsis,” or rather the expulsion of 
emotions is occurring in relation to anxieties and frustrations of developments in the 
historical contexts of which the films were made. 
 One last, important distinction that I have to make is that this study also has the 
possibility of falling into the same problem as Prince’s work. In no way do I intend for 
this study to be a validation of a disreputable body of work by an ultraviolent director. I 
am not studying these films and saying that they are worth study because they too have 
social commentary and historical value. Rather, I am saying that even these films that are 
indicative of a “bankrupt, reductive postmodernism” are worth studying for they do not 
exist in a cultural vacuum (Dargis 14). Even the most disreputable films are products of a 
society and a culture and are reflective of that culture that produces and consumes it. 
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Nonetheless, this study echoes Prince’s desire to make meaning out of 
representations of violence. I find Prince’s work especially valuable for his schema of 
analyzing ultraviolence on three levels: history, aesthetics, and social effects. I too evoke 
a historical context in which the films were made, and in which the meaning of an 
aesthetic of savagery must be considered. To a certain degree, Prince’s work also directs 
my own in the sense that I look to political allegory within the films, but without an 
added emphasis on authorial intent. Instead, my main method of approaching the films 
will be textual analysis, which may or may not resist authorial intent. I intend to interpret 
thematic, formal, and narrative motifs that occur through all three of the films, which 
might have special meaning or resonance for Korean spectators during those historical 
moments. 
 I look to Kim Kyung Hyun’s “‘Tell the Kitchen That There’s Too Much Buchu in 
the Dumpling’: Reading Park Chan-wook’s ‘Unknowable’ Old Boy” in order to address 
contemporary existing literature on the Vengeance Trilogy. Attiudes towards the film 
both in and outside of academia focus on the formal strategies of the films and I use 
Kim’s article to question those attitudes. According to Kim, there is a “postmodern” 
disposition to all three films where the image is simply an image. Due to its lack of any 
relation to reality, it is “unknowable” (84). Kim posits that the central motifs to Park’s 
work including the “flattened mise-en-scène, the commodified body, the mystification of 
spatial markers, and the disjointed juxtaposition of images and sound” contribute to the 
creation of “the post-politics or anti history of Park Chan-wook” (87). In essence, Kim 
positions Oldboy on a formal level that renders its substanceless as intentional strategy. 
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Like Prince, Kim essentially also corroborates popular criticism towards the films by 
positing that superficiality is equivalent to overt stylization. Kim makes several strong 
arguments including his formal analysis but neglects to take into account the films’ 
socially charged narratives. The films are specifically about a knowable Korea: the very 
Korea of the 2000’s and includes images of recent history in order to reinforce that. 
 Kim’s account of the “unknowable” is not entirely clear. He claims that his three 
goals in the essay are to analyze the ways in which the motifs in the films “explore the 
potential of cinema in ways that may have vexing epistemological implications”, and to 
analyze Park’s notions of vengeance in the context of Nietzschean thought, particularly 
“ressentiment” and to investigate whether a political reading is possible at all (87). His 
analysis of vengeance seems to be extraneous to his argument of the “unknowable” and 
does not aid to clarify it. I will counter Kim’s essay with my analysis and argue as to why 
the Trilogy is not part of a “post-politics,” “anti-history”. 
Mika Ko’s “The Break-up of the National Body: Cosmetic Multiculturalism and 
Films of Miike Takashi” has also informed my work. Using Terry Eagleton’s and Mary 
Douglas’s models, Ko centers her essay around the use of body as metaphor and applies 
her methodology to the films of Miike Takashi. She argues that the body metaphor has 
become a key issue in Japanese cinema and its role in national identity (30). Ko situates 
Miike in this context by citing the abundance of violence that the body endures and links 
it to other motifs. Most notable is the concern with a pan-Asian Japan. Miike frequently 
features non-Japanese characters and/or the life of Japanese characters in other Asian 
countries. Ko argues that the mutilation of the personal body is allegorical for the weak 
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national body, and the influx of foreigners in Japan (31). Taking my lead from Ko, I too 
use her model of body metaphors to contextualize my analysis of violence within recent 
Korean history. 
In order to do this, I must consider the construction of Korea and more 
importantly, Korean citizens in the films. First I turn to Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities and his statement: 
 My point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in 
  view of that word’s multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as   
  nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind (4). 
If the nation of Korea is an “imagined community” and nationality, nation-ness, 
nationalism, and national identity are all cultural artifacts, how are these aspects imagined 
within a cultural artifact? Like Miike’s construction of Japan, Park’s Korea cannot exist 
without its citizens. 
 Giorgio Agamben discusses the conception of citizenship in France in Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. He contends that citizenship can be defined in 
two ways: either through place of birth or through lineage i.e. blood (Agamben, 1998). 
Most of the characters in the Vengeance Trilogy either bleed or become mutilated at one 
point or another. These characters are citizens of the diegetic Korea, and their blood, or 
more specifically bloodshed defines citizenship. Like Agamben’s account of life in 
contemporary Western societies, life itself is regulated and has a very specific role in the 
Korea of the Vengeance Trilogy. For Park the paradoxical spilling of blood is inherent to 
citizenship. Citizenship does not entail being a part of a strong national body, but rather 
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being a unit of a weak national body susceptible to social discrimination. This is directly 
linked with issues of the actual Korea, as “blood” is a central element of the Korean 
imaginary. 
 I engage Park’s films within and through a dialogue about contemporary Korea. A 
main discourse in relation to recent history is that of nationalism and national identity. 
One way in which nationalism has been propagated in the country is through “ethnic 
identity” and it is blood that allows for that ethnic identity. Shin Gi-wook’s Ethnic 
Nationalism in Korea is integral in understanding this phenomenon. Nationalism based 
on ethnic identity has been used in different ways during the rise of capitalism and 
democratization. The Korean government pushed their agenda by emphasizing that the 
citizens shared the same blood while president Park Chung-hee stressed ethnic unity by 
linking capitalism with Korea’s long history and tradition by citing Confucius. However, 
ethnic identity has been a site for resistance as well, and so Park has a predecessor. 
Student activists have also used blood-based nationalism in their anti-government, anti-
American rhetoric as well (Gi-wook Shin, 2006). This is crucial to the analysis of Park’s 
films for it is my contention that the films are in direct response to mainstream notions of 
nationalism, and ultimately the films are about the construction of nationalism, and offer 
an alternative nationalism as a critique on capitalist hegemony. 
Such events as these are central to the sociohistorical context of the films, the last 
thirty years in South Korean history. In particular I examine the cultural effect of these 
events: the end of authoritarianism, the beginnings of democratization, and the hope that 
was promised to the people of South Korea by economic liberalism. The 1980’s and 90’s 
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are marked by a deflation of this hope, by fear and anxiety during the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997, and by a popular disappointment over the failure to diminish gender and 
class inequities (Abelmann, 1993; Robinson, 2007). 
As far as the cinematic context is concerned, democratization brought about 
changes in Korea’s national cinema, making cinema a central arena where social issues 
have been addressed. What makes Park’s films stand out is his place in contemporary 
mainstream cinema. Even though Korean cinema has been continuously engaged with 
society and politics, the idea of a fractured society has seemed to vanish from mainstream 
popular Korean cinema. Despite any sense of polarization, Park is still considered a 
mainstream filmmaker who has been relatively successful at the box office. And he is a 
mainstream filmmaker who is still steeped in the relatively recent tradition of using his 
films as a medium to voice social concerns (Min, 2003; Chi-yun Shin, 2005). 
Furthermore, Park has used violence as his receptacle for social commentary, and 
he is not alone. Other South Korean directors who prominently use violence (Kim Ki-duk 
and Kim Ji-woon) emerged alongside Park in the late 90’s and early 2000’s. Because this 
was a contested political period, numerous censorship laws were lifted (Min 167). Up 
until that point and excessive violence was not a tool that Korean filmmakers could use. 
 Using this theoretical backdrop, this study has found that the protagonists of the 
films or the citizens are locked in constant struggle that ultimately turns out to be futile. 
Their resistance is in vain because their citizenship demands their blood, as does the 
nation. The construction of the national body (capitalism and democratization) demands 
it. Body parts are not only disconnected from the body, they are also used as commerce, 
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traded in exchange for other services and/or items. This allegory of the body mirrors the 
argument that Korea’s current economic status came at the cost of blood – starting, 
perhaps, with Park Chung-hee’s sending of Korean troops to Vietnam in exchange for 
American economic support (Kwak, 2009). The characters’ bodies are representative of 
the national body, and allegorize the lack of integrity in the nation: while the hegemonic 
nationalism argues that the country is at its strongest –  in terms of social unity and 
cultural cohesion – the films are pointing to the contrary. The country is economically 
strong and progressing, but at an enormous price. 
 
Chapter Summary 
This thesis analyzes the films of the Vengeance Trilogy, and does so in 
chronological order in order to map pertinent changes – and variable positions – in the 
films and their treatments of Korean society. The first chapter explores Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance. Sympathy is a complex and rich text, an ambiguous film that was critically 
acclaimed yet neglected by Korean audiences (Clarke). Why did Korean audiences 
initially shun Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance, especially when Park’s earlier film, Joint 
Security Area J.S.A. (Gongdong gyeongbi guyeok JSA)(2000) was the highest grossing 
film in Korean history? Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance is the least conventional in its 
narrative tendencies and the least accessible, and as South Korean audiences are still 
more receptive to Hollywood films and conventional narratives, Sympathy was a film that 
was a complete departure from J.S.A. Considering that the Korean box office is mostly 
occupied by comedies, romances, and melodramas, this along with the taboo themes and 
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social commentary presented through the ultraviolent content, all contributed to this 
neglect. 
Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance forgoes traditional narrative structure to feature two 
protagonists who set about exacting vengeance on one another; the only “antagonist” is 
the society that has pitted these two characters against one another. The two Mr. 
Vengeances are also stratified on a class basis, with Ryu (Shin Ha-gyun) being a deaf-
mute factory worker and Dong-jin (Song Kang-ho) a wealthy industrialist. The film sides 
with neither character though, and in the end, both meet tragic ends. 
2002, the year of the film’s release, was an important year in Korean history as 
Japan and Korea co-hosted the World Cup. 2002 was a year unlike any other, where 
nationalism was at its peak, and a palpable feeling of unity ran throughout the peninsula. 
The strength of the discourse could be felt for years after as clips of the event were 
regularly featured in the media for years to come. Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance is a film 
in dialogue with these issues, but also in relation to Park’s own oeuvre. Coming directly 
after J.S.A., another film that could have contributed to popular nationalism in its themes 
of South Korean and North Korean harmony, Sympathy directly refutes that. Yes the 
working-class and upper class protagonists were equal, but they were only equal in their 
equal oppression by society. 
 In Oldboy the protagonist and the antagonist are clearly designated with the 
middle-class white collar Dae-su (Choi Min-sik) stalking the man who imprisoned him 
for 15 years, Woo-jin (Yu Ji-tae). To reach Woo-jin and exact his revenge, Dae-su must 
navigate the concrete jungle that is present day Seoul and ascend Woo-jin’s ivory tower. 
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What he learns is that he himself is the target of Woo-jin’s revenge for his indirect role in 
Woo-jin’s sister’s suicide. Not unlike Sympathy, both characters are equal in their close 
proximity to violence, and yet it is only the upper class Woo-jin who has his vengeance. 
Like Dong-jin and Ryu before him, Dae-su too undergoes a transformation in his 
masculine identity that is much more pronounced than in Mr. Vengeance. He is not only 
hardened and stronger, he is more sexually virile and able to ascend the social latter and 
(seemingly) reach the upper class. That victory is momentary, however. 
 Choi Min-sik’s positioning as a prominent middle-class figure in popular media 
around the time of these films is relevant. With the disappointment in unfulfilled 
promises of economic growth and modernization, the late-90’s and early 2000’s saw the 
emergence of narratives related to reinvigorating the father. Choi himself played several 
characters who were down-and-out fathers staging their comebacks in commercials and 
films. In this context, Oldboy too portrays a loser father against class stagnation but 
presents a new galvanized identity, only to squash this father at the end of the film. In 
effect, Oldboy and Mr. Vengeance are also offering alternative forms of masculinity, and 
yet overturn those identities as they are defeated by social injustices. 
 This could also be linked to an acceptance of the construction of gender in Oldboy 
as well as of the particular star image. Both Song Kang-ho and Choi Min-sik are now 
recognized as two of the country’s most successful actors and the star images of both 
actors share similarities as well, having played down-on-their-luck father figures. This 
construction of the failed father has been used in mainstream media as a motif of popular 
nationalism. In other words, nationalist discourses have used this image to instill hope 
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while acknowledging the disappointment in democratization, a completely different 
message and purpose than how Park was using those images. 
 Oldboy also has a direct address of the social context of the films. In an early 
scene the film shows in split-screen an edited sequence of Dae-su’s 15-year 
imprisonment juxtaposed against footage of the last 15 years in South Korean history. It 
is one of the most telling scenes in the film as Oldboy explicitly declares its engagement 
with South Korean history and society. 
 Lady Vengeance speaks of the same issues, but introduces several new ones as 
well, with the main concern being women’s issues. On a reception level, Lady Vengeance 
is curious in that around the film’s release, the mainstream Korean media focused not on 
the violence nor social themes but the make-up and atypical casting choice of actor Lee 
Young-ae. Unlike the other films, where other issues such as the content or the 
performances were commented on, the coverage of Lady Vengeance gravitated towards 
the physical appearance of its lead. By far, Lee’s more “conventional” star image hinges 
on her beauty and lacks the specific class connotations to Song and Park’s star images. 
 This peculiar marketing is supported by divergent narrative elements of the film.  
The protagonist Geum-ja (Lee Yeong-ae) is the only protagonist in the trilogy to succeed 
in her revenge and find redemption as well. In addition, Geum-ja is the only character to 
not take a hands-on approach, as she uses other people to commit the actual revenge. 
Geum-ja also does not meet a gruesome fate at the end of the film, possibly because 
imagery of violence perpetrated against a beautiful actor could be much less agreeable for 
audiences. 
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However, despite these discrepancies Lady Vengeance presents a strong critique 
on women’s issues in contemporary Korea. Through its treatment of its title character as 
well as a slew of other female characters, Lady Vengeance addresses the marginalized 
role of women. This critique revolves around the woman’s place in the Confucius 
household. A nation long influenced by Confucian thought, it still manifests itself in 
Korean society through gender inequity (Bell 20). For example, while women have 
struggled for equal rights, popular discourses have defined the woman’s role as being 
“the good wife, wise mother (hyonmo yangcho)”(Ling 175). Lady Vengeance highlights 
these conflicting ideas by presenting women in the role of the Confucian wife and 
mother, and in peril. 
Women’s issues are by far the primary concern to Lady Vengeance, and while 
they are not exclusive from class struggles, they are placed in the foreground. This is not 
the only new issue that Lady Vengeance brings to the Vengeance Trilogy: education is 
the other. Education has historically been a concern of the Korean populace but recent 
years has seen the national interest in education reaching a fever pitch. Michael J. Seth 
cites high expenditures (in comparison to income levels), an obsession with 
examinations, and the desire for degrees from prestigious universities as the signifiers of 
“education fever” in Korea (224). Among the newer issues to emerge is the fixation with 
English education, and Lady Vengeance addresses these matters. The antagonist of the 
film is a kidnapper and serial murderer but also an English educator who chooses his 
victim through the private language school he teaches at. Furthermore, the film shows the 
families of the victims and the hardships they had endured in order to send their children 
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to the pricey schools. This does not bring them the bright futures they had expected; 
instead all that awaits them is tragedy. In an extreme manner, Lady Vengeance 
allegorizes the high cost of education. 
The conclusion of the thesis will tie the films together and while much more work 
needs to be done, I will cautiously posit that the Vengeance Trilogy constructs an 
alternative nationalism that does not conceal the implicit struggles in contemporary 
Korean society. For the characters of Park Chan-wook’s films, violence is the receptacle 
through which they can reach new identities, but identities that are doomed to fail in the 
face of the dominant social forces they attempt to resist. Subsequently, Park turns to 
violence as the main tool to present that alternative national identity. 
I will also briefly address the work that must be done beyond this thesis. One 
crucial element that I have not approached is the issue of historical reception. The next 
step in this study is to gather accounts of historical reception in order to gauge whether or 
not audiences did engage with the social commentary. As previously mentioned, Park is 
not the only ultraviolent filmmaker to emerge in the late 90’s. Furthermore, more and 
more films feature graphic violence accompanied with social commentary. The recent 
award-winning Breathless (Ddongpari)(2009) is another example. The next step would 
be then to situate Park with these other filmmakers and to situate him within a movement 
of Korean national cinema. 
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CHAPTER 1: THE EQUAL INEQUITY IN SYMPATHY FOR MR. VENGEANCE 
The Korean and English titles of the first film in Park Chan-wook’s Vengeance 
Trilogy, Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance (2002), offer a point of entry to this study. The 
international release of the film featured the title Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance, which is 
not a direct translation of the domestic release title, Boksuneun naui geot. Boksuneun 
naui geot literally translated is “Vengeance Is Mine”.2 Both titles connote a single 
protagonist while the film has two protagonists and two points of view. Each title asks 
different questions. The international title prompts audiences to as who Mr. Vengeance is 
and why he is worthy of sympathy. My answer is that both protagonists are Mr. 
Vengeance and that both should be offered sympathy. The Korean title in turn elicits the 
question, who is claiming vengeance? Neither does. 
Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance initially follows Ryu (Shin Ha-kyun), a deaf and 
mute factory laborer whose sister (Lim Ji-eun) is dying of kidney failure. Ryu has saved 
up 10,000,000 won for the operation, but he is not a match and is put on the waiting list. 
Ryu, fired from his job, turns to black market organ traffickers who tell him they will 
give him a compatible kidney in exchange for one of his own. At the exchange, the 
traffickers take Ryu’s kidney and his money. Ryu soon finds out however that a suitable 
donor has been found; now all he needs is the 10,000,000 won for surgery. Ryu and his 
activist girlfriend Yeong-mi (Bae Du-na) decide to kidnap Yu-sun (Han Bo-bae), the 
daughter of the factory owner to make the money, and do so. When Ryu’s sister commits 
                                                
2 It is noteworthy that Imamura Shouhei’s film Vengeance Is Mine (Fukushû suruwa 
wareniari)(1979), based on the true story of serial killer Nishiguchi Akira, is also known 
by the same title, Boksuneun naui geot in South Korea.  
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suicide and Yu-sun drowns in an accident Ryu seeks revenge against the organ 
traffickers.  
The industrialist and second protagonist of the film, Dong-jin seeks his own 
vengeance when Yu-sun turns up dead and murders Yeong-mi. After Ryu kills the 
traffickers and discovers his dead girlfriend, Ryu redirects his own vengeance towards 
Dong-jin and the two collide. Dong-jin ultimately claims Ryu’s life. The film’s 
conclusion finds Yeong-mi’s radical cohorts tracking Dong-jin down and unflinchingly 
stabbing him again and again before pinning a death warrant into his chest with a 
bayonet. By the end of the film both protagonists are dead. Although they have attempted 
to escape the confines of their respective places in society, they have changed nothing. 
 
Formal Analysis and Reception 
While Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance had a budget of 3.1 billion won, there are 
several elements that separate it from the average Korean mainstream blockbuster. The 
film’s divergences are both on the formal and narrative level, featuring: two protagonists, 
minimal dialogue, long shot duration, and a downbeat ending. Shot in a near monotone, 
Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance uses flat blue and gray tones to express coldness mirrored 
in the narrative and create its gloomy atmosphere. The art design maintains that tone, 
especially the sets, most notably Ryu’s house. The sets and locations construct an 
uncomfortable and strange space and thus create an alienating effect. Dong-jin’s 
neighborhood also has a sense of unfamiliarity in a different manner, as it is a relatively 
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stylistically tame space. The space is alienating as such affluent areas are by far a rarity in 
Korea. 
 The film has a minimal score. The frequent silence accentuates the sound effects, 
an important strategy in the presentation of ultraviolence: the use of sound effects. The 
violence takes place off-screen in many instances, with sound effects being the main way 
in which the violence is presented. In one sequence Dong-jin watches the autopsy of his 
daughter. The camera focuses on him while the mortician proceeds to use an electric saw 
on her body, heard and not seen.  
Compared to Park’s more action-oriented J.S.A. and Oldboy. Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance maintains a much slower pace through its longer shot length and editing with 
an average shot length of 12 seconds. The film frequently relies on prolonged static shots, 
often with the characters directly staring at the camera. This could show awareness of the 
international market (and Park’s place within it) as ultraviolent director Kitano Takeshi 
frequently uses such compositions which David Bordwell calls a “clothesline” 
composition (647).  
 Park Chan-wook had made three films before he gained widespread recognition 
with his fourth film, J.S.A. (Gongdong gyeongbi guyeok JSA)(2000). At the time of its 
release, J.S.A. was the highest-grossing film in South Korean history, a suspense/action 
drama with a different perspective on North/South anxieties that resonated with 
audiences (Chi-yun Shin 56). With J.S.A., Park had become a commercially viable 
director, which allowed him freedom in choosing his next project, Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance. Essentially, Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance was the follow-up to a hugely 
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popular film by the same hot director starring two of the same principal actors. Naturally, 
the studios made sure to emphasize both of these similarities in the marketing, and it is 
presumable that many spectators went to see the film on that basis. Historical audiences 
most likely noticed he discrepancies between the two films. Ultimately, Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance was an unconventional film, yet targeted at a mainstream audience. 
 Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance was not nearly as successful J.S.A., failing to break 
the top 10 box office films in 2002 (“Sympathy”, Cinedie). For the most part, the film 
was critically acclaimed but mainstream Korean audiences shunned Sympathy. One 
reviewer notes that there were reports of viewers throwing up at press screenings of the 
film (Eun-ju Park). Generally, mainstream Korean cinema was and still remains violent; 
the relatively new Korean blockbuster is filled with gunfights and explosions. Two 
examples are the aforementioned J.S.A as well as Swiri (1999). However, the violence of 
Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance was different: it was more extreme and more akin to the 
films of international ultraviolent directors (such as Kitano Takeshi and Miike Takashi). 
Mainstream audiences were not used to this type of ultraviolence. The late 90’s and early 
2000’s were a period in which various restrictions and censorship laws were lifted, and 
this is why Park was able to produce such a brutal mainstream film.  
We have leniency for expressing violence, because we’ve gone through a 
period in which violence was all too familiar under our military 
dictatorship (Park, “Old Boy”). 
Another, more significant reason that Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance was 
unsuccessful was its pointed and depressing social commentary. I believe that the 
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spectators’ alienation was deepened by Park’s challenge to and disparaging of popular 
nationalist notions, and his extensive use of ultraviolence to pose those questions. 
 
Central Themes 
 Revenge is the projected thesis of the Vengeance trilogy and it is a central theme 
to all three films. However, the vengeance in itself is not as important as the presence of a 
central struggle and the carnage that ensues. In Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance, all of the 
misfortune that befalls the central characters stems from their class positions. Ryu’s class 
position is emphasized from the beginning: he is a disempowered lower/working-class 
handicapped factory laborer. Dong-jin on the other hand is the successful owner of a 
factory, and yet he too does not live a serene life. The film goes out of its way to not only 
code the characters by class, but to control them through class. 
 The film’s preoccupation with class struggle is further demonstrated by the fact 
that it has two protagonists. The film gives equal weight to both characters and by doing 
so forgoes the conventional dichotomy of “good” protagonist vs. “evil” antagonist 
focusing. It instead focuses on two class-stratified characters. Furthermore, the cause and 
effect-based narrative gives both characters justification for seeking vengeance with 
points of subjectivity in both as well3. Finally, the film’s ending favors neither character. 
Both die. Some commentators have noted of the nihilism of Park’s work and that Dong-
jin’s death is due to the film’s karmic logic. Ryu, Yeong-mi, Dong-jin, and the organ 
                                                3	  The	  marketing	  of	  the	  film	  made	  it	  seem	  as	  if	  Song	  was	  the	  protagonist	  even	  though	  he	  is	  not.	  Song	  received	  top	  billing	  and	  was	  the	  most	  successful	  of	  the	  film’s	  leads	  at	  the	  time.	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dealers have all taken part in atrocities, and so they have atrocious things done unto them. 
However, Ryu’s sister, Yu-sun, and Peng (the fired employee) and his family all die 
without having done anything deplorable. All of those characters however are linked to 
the capitalist motivations of the film. Dong-jin’s death is not due to karma, but because 
he is “equal” to Ryu. While Ryu and Dong-jin are polar opposites in class, they are equal 
in society. Class controls them, and by extension, so does capitalism. This is further 
sustained by the film’s most bizarre element: Dong-jin’s murderers. 
 When Dong-jin captures and tortures Yeong-mi, she threatens him, telling him 
that if he kills her, the members of her terrorist cell will find and kill him. This is almost 
directly refuted afterwards when the detectives investigating her murder speak amongst 
themselves, saying that the only member of her organization was Yeong-mi herself. 
However, in the most fantastical scene of the film, a car pulls up to Dong-jin and four 
men get out and stare at him. The cinematography of the scene accentuates its bizarreness 
as the shot captures the men in extreme close-up, barely moving as they stare at Dong-jin 
and smoke. Shockingly, the men abruptly stab Dong-jin repeatedly. It is here that the 
audience hears a voiceover of Yeong-mi’s threat, confirming the identity of Dong-jin’s 
assailants. Many have commented on the strangeness of this sequence, leading to 
discussions as to whether it happens within the diegesis or not. My argument is that the 
nature of the scene and the attackers is not to designate it as fantasy but to disassociate 
the attackers and separate them: their role is to represent an abstract concept. The 
attackers as important as is Dong-jin’s fate: death. Dong-jin’s journey of revenge is at 
essence his attempt to transcend his own class position. And all of the class struggles of 
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the film and the resistance to society end with dismal results. Thus, I identify Dong-jin’s 
attackers as representatives of society. They are killing Dong-jin not on Yeong-mi’s 
behalf, but as surrogates for society. 
 
Capitalism and Ultraviolence 
Capitalism is almost always accompanied by violence. And there are a number of 
reasons why I classify the violence in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance as ultraviolence. As 
Stephen Prince posits in Screening Violence, ultraviolence first appeared in Hollywood 
films in the late 1960’s in films like Bonnie and Clyde (1967) and The Wild Bunch 
(1969). While Prince does not explicitly define his use of the term, he does contend that it 
is comparatively more graphic than the violence found in films before its emergence, a 
graphicness facilitated by technological advancements in special effects but also the 
sociohistorical context that led to acceptance of edgier material. Prince also maintains 
that ultraviolence is socially conscious, although the term’s use in mainstream media 
does not include this qualification (Prince, 2000). Instead, the term seems to connote any 
media violence that is more graphic than conventional uses of violence, regardless of 
media format. 
One of the key characteristics of the brutality within the film and what codes it as 
ultraviolence is the abundant mutilation. The body is particularly susceptible to graphic 
mutilation in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance. The body cannot be contained and this “lack 
of bodily integrity” is demonstrated through either dismemberment and removal of body 
parts, or the release of bodily fluids (Ko 31). Ryu has his kidney stolen and he in turn 
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steals and eats the kidneys of his enemies. Dong-jin then murders and cuts Ryu into 
pieces. Ryu, Dong-jin, Yeong-mi, Ryu’s sister, Peng, as well as the organ dealers all 
bleed profusely as the result of cuts and/or other wounds. Yeong-mi in particular 
exemplifies this letting of bodily fluids as her torture leads to the secretion of both blood 
and urine. 
This motif of the lack of bodily integrity makes it evident how the body serves as 
the site where capitalism and bloodshed intersect. The bodies in Sympathy For Mr 
Vengence are commodified. This is because body parts are actually used in the economic 
dealings of the film. Ryu’s sister needs a kidney but Ryu cannot offer his own for he is 
incompatible. Ryu turns to the organ dealers – a business that deals in the body – to trade 
them a compatible kidney for his own. The dealers steal both Ryu’s kidney and his 
money and thus when a compatible donor is found for Ryu’s sister, Ryu is unable to 
“purchase” the kidney. This then leads to Ryu and Yeong-mi’s kidnapping Dong-jin’s 
daughter for ransom, the ransom that will go to the operation. The body is constantly 
victimized by violence, but it is also a cause of the violence; the body must be sacrificed 
in the name of capitalism. 
 This commodification and mutilation of the body constitutes the film’s central 
objects of criticism in South Korean history: the nation’s process of capitalization. One 
of, if not the most central figure in the capitalization of South Korea was military 
president Park Chung-hee. It was Park’s dealings with the United States that were crucial 
to the capitalization and modernization of South Korea and some of those dealings 
revolved around in the Vietnam War. The U.S. agreed to support South Korea financially 
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in return for Korea’s agreement to send troops to Vietnam to support the U.S (Kwak, 
2009). In essence, the modernization and capitalization of the country was paid with the 
blood of young Korean men. Similarly, Republic of Korea forces were sent to support the 
U.S. in Afghanistan, a move that was decried by many, not helped by recent anti-
American sentiments in the country. Equally, in a more indirect and abstract manner and 
yet pertinent manner, industrialization has occurred at the expense of the exploitation of 
the lower and working class, and in recent years the growing class divide has become a 
major problem in the country, with the upper-class growing smaller and richer and the 
lower-class growing larger and poorer. What the film is ultimately contending is that the 
bodies of Korean citizens have built and sustained the nation. 
The brutality in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance is intrinsically linked with issues of 
capitalism, and thus fulfills Prince’s criteria of being socially motivated. Noting of both 
director Park Chan-wook’s work as well as fellow ultraviolent Korean director Kim Ki-
duk, Grady Hendrix comments “the use of violence” is “the great leveller between 
classes” (19). The ultraviolence in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance levels classes, but also 
negates them. In other words, violence negates classes by executing the rich and the poor 
alike. Class status becomes a moot point. There is also a dimension of false hope to the 
violence that mirrors the false hope that the Korean people were given through the 
processes of democratization and capitalization. Initially, aggression gives social mobility 
to the disempowered (Ryu), and seems to be the great leveler of class in that sense.  
Ryu gains the means to retaliate against proponents of a society that has repressed 
him through violence. Dong-jin does not gain social mobility, but the means to act on his 
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own social anxieties. Ultraviolence brings both men to an equal playing field and into 
close proximity. They are two men at the opposite ends of the social spectrum, a factory 
worker and a rich industrialist. Such a meeting would most likely never happen in the 
capitalist setting of contemporary South Korea. In essence, both men gain new identities, 
and indeed new, close masculinities. 
 
Patriarchy and Masculinity 
Patriarchy is an issue that is integral to masculinity. A nation still rooted in 
Confucian ideology, South Korea still tends to think in patriarchal terms. Confucian 
patriarchal ideology manifests itself in a culture that emphasizes the family with an added 
prominence of the father (Bell 20, 22). While Confucian thought originally stressed 
respect, compassion, and understanding, the significance of the father has been 
interpreted and transformed into practices of sexism, racism, and class-based bias. Chan 
Sin Yee points out such an interpretation centering on the Confucian concept of yin-yang. 
According to Chan, while the yin-yang distinction was meant to be complimentary, later 
applications interpreted it as a distinction of gender hierarchy (322-323). How do the 
main characters of Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance fare as patriarchal figures? 
Ryu is the victim of a patriarchal society. Initially Ryu is inept due to his physical 
handicap. Because of his weakness he cannot provide for his family in the ways a male 
figure should, and his sister dies as a consequence. In addition, Ryu’s girlfriend Yeong-
mi dominates Ryu. Similarly, Dong-jin, a nontraditional single father cannot protect his 
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daughter. Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance depicts the compromising of a “traditional” 
patriarchal father figure and a male disempowered by the effects of a patriarchal society.  
Those roles change when both characters set out for revenge and both become the 
aggressors. Even though the protagonists have gained the tools and mobility with which 
to resist oppression as well as transcend their traditional patriarchal social roles, they 
have lost just as much as all parties involved and die. In Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance’s 
South Korea the new masculinity and opposition are essentially futile. Its society allows 
absolutely no possibility of a better future.  
 
Citizenship, National Identity, Nationalism, and The Historical Context 
I now turn to an inspection of the film’s construction of national identity and of 
citizenship. Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance offers a myriad of characters that function in 
the diegetic society in different capacities. Dong-jin and his friend are rich industrialists 
who aid the economy through their businesses but also through their roles as consumers 
(they dine at the American family restaurant T.G.I. Friday’s). Ryu and Peng are the hard-
working lower-class laborers who serve as the backbone of those industries. Yeong-mi, 
the activist questions her government in contrast to the other female characters, Ryu’s 
sister, and Yu-sun, who cannot fend for themselves. Finally, the organ dealers exploit and 
take advantage of the other citizens. 
If we consider that the film is specifically speaking of Korea, then take into 
account that the characters are citizens of that Korea, how does Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance define citizenship? Ronald Beiner notes that citizenship is “what draws a 
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body of citizens together into a coherent and stably organized political community, and 
keeps the allegiance durable.” In relation to contemporary North American society Beiner 
contends that citizenship revolves around capitalism in a social and economic capacity, 
and “intellectually to some variety of liberalism” (1). 
If one of the key functions of citizenship is to allow inclusion into a political body 
that protects the citizen from “belligerent people who will harm us or seize our 
possessions.” This protection will come from the political body, the state, and through 
other citizens who act for the state, sometimes at the cost of their own lives (Wulf 1). The 
citizenship in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance directly refutes this. There is no protection 
from those belligerent people on behalf of the state; the state is nearly non-existent. In 
one case, the state as represented by the detective (Lee Dae-yeon) actually aids Dong-jin 
in tracking down his quarry and expedites the violence (for money, nonetheless). Thus 
inclusion to the political body in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance not only offers no 
mediation between citizens, it actually fosters it and requires it. 
If national identity can be considered to be multi-faceted and consists of (but not 
limited) to identification of the citizen in the capacities of family, territory, class, religion, 
and ethnicity, then Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance ponders national identity in many of 
those lights (Smith 4). This national identity differs drastically from that presented by 
much of popular nationalism in the last thirty years. With the transition from dictatorship 
to democracy came promises of great hope from the government to the people. A poor 
country with a long history of war and defeat, the advent of democracy, industrialization, 
and capitalization gave newfound hope to Koreans for a bright future. And in order to 
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facilitate their agenda, the past presidents have turned to a nationalism based on blood 
and ethnic unity (Gi-wook Shin 3-4). Early in the process Park Chung-hee promoted the 
prospect of capitalism by linking it with Confucius and thus linked it with the long 
history and culture of the nation (Gi-wook Shin 14). The hope of the 80’s did not last and 
the 90’s brought a deep-seeded disappointment exemplified by the 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis (Abelmann 4; Robinson 173). By the turn of the century, however, hope was 
renewed, and nationalism was once again strong, with the 2000 Intra-Korean Summit and 
the 2002 Japan-Korea World Cup. Never before had the peninsula seen a people so 
united, with millions of citizens hitting the streets, donned in blazing red, cheering along 
with several key phrases including, “We are one” (Gi-wook Shin 4). Popular discourses 
maintained that Koreans were linked by blood, one people that could trace its ancestry to 
its first ancestor, a people that was strong and united (Gi-wook Shin 2). Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance also links the citizens of the Republic of Korea through their blood, but not in 
the same way. 
In his Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Giorgio Agamben speaks of 
the concept of citizenship in the French Revolution. Agamben notes that there are two 
ways that citizenship was defined: either the individual was born on French soil – which 
includes French territory as well as the mainland – or the individual’s parents were 
French citizens. In other words, the individual becomes a citizen through blood or land. 
This stress on citizenship through blood also sets up the future of France, as the passing 
of blood to the progeny of French citizens ensures future citizens as well (Agamben, 
1997). According to this schema then the characters of Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance are 
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Korean citizens because of their blood, but more specifically through the shedding of 
their blood. And again, the nation is not only constituted of citizens who gain citizenship 
through their blood(shed), it is also a country whose economic prosperity is built on that 
blood. What identifies a citizen of Korea in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance is their 
sacrifice. Blood lost through violence fuels the economy and the economy fuels the 
country. The country is economically thriving but what is the country for? The nation is 
prospering at the cost of its citizens’ lives, and in its current state, this is the only way that 
it can prosper. Furthermore while the nation may thrive on an economic basis, it literally 
has no future. Because blood is shed, it cannot be passed to future generations and indeed 
all of the children in Sympathy are dead. 
A parallel can be found in the work of Japanese ultraviolent filmmaker, Miike 
Takashi. Miike’s work is notorious for its shocking, bizarre ultraviolence. Mika Ko’s 
work on Miike has also identified social commentary within his oeuvre, and in particular 
Ko identifies a dominant motif of the lack of “bodily integrity” in Miike’s films. I follow 
Ko’s model in a number of ways. Ko begins by looking to Terry Eagleton and Eagleton’s 
claim that the body has become the center of contemporary critical theory (30). Similarly, 
Steven Shaviro notes the importance of the body in society, contending that it can be a 
means and end to social control (135). Ko uses Eagleton’s model of looking to body 
metaphors but notes that Eagleton does not effectively use body metaphors in 
“contemporary critical discourse.” She then argues that the body metaphor is increasingly 
important in contemporary Japanese cinema, especially in relation to issues of national 
and personal identity (30). Ko looks to anthropologist Mary Douglas to flesh out her own 
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use of body metaphor. According to Ko, Douglas attempts to situate the body within 
society and argues that society is not necessarily a body in itself, but instead contends that 
the body is “a site of information.” Ko notes, “For Douglas, the body expresses the 
relationship of the individual to the group and it both represents and contributes to the 
social situation at any given moment” (35). For Ko then, Douglas’s formulation allows 
her to see the text as a body. The filmic body’s treatment of itself and of the actual bodies 
within its text can be considered to be sites of information that embody notions of the 
society that the bodies exist within (35).  
According to Ko, Miike is addressing notions of multiculturalism in an 
increasingly globalized Japan through his frequent use of non-Japanese and mixed ethnic 
characters. The bodies of these characters and others represent the national body and the 
notion of kokutai. Kokutai is the belief that the national body is one, and that the citizen’s 
body represents the nation and thus are united in that way as well. Ko then identifies 
bodily mutilation and the lack of bodily integrity as being Miike’s signifying a weak 
national body. Ko does make sure to distinguish her argument and notes that her study is 
one that is centered on the relationship between body and national mythology more than 
nation.   
Using Ko’s model then, I contend that the filmic body (the text) and the film’s 
representations of the body are relating the body with popular nationalism. These same 
motifs of the lack of bodily integrity and the national body as individual’s body can be 
found in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance. The body metaphors in Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance allegorize a construction of national identity that is in response to the popular 
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dominant presentations of national identity. Shaviro argues that social hierarchies can be 
subverted through the body and this is exactly what the film is attempting to do (65). 
Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance is the first film in a series of films that contain social 
critiques of contemporary society and present alternative national identity. Both Oldboy 
and Lady Vengeance must be considered in order to postulate just how exactly the 
Vengeance Trilogy does so. Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance is undoubtedly about the 
contemporary South Korean experience, providing a ground zero for this alternative 
national identity in the Vengeance Trilogy. The Koreans in the film are bonded by their 
victimization to capitalism, and their ultimate fates.  
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CHAPTER 2: OLDBOY AND THE FALSE HOPE OF CLASS MOBILITY 
 Oldboy (2004), the best-known film of the Vengeance Trilogy, made Park Chan-
wook famous in South Korea and internationally. In her New York Times review, 
Manohla Dargis noted:  
The fact that "Oldboy" is embraced by some cinephiles is symptomatic of 
a bankrupt, reductive postmodernism: one that promotes a spurious 
aesthetic relativism (it's all good) and finds its crudest expression in the 
hermetically sealed world of fan boys (14). 
The characterizations of Oldboy’s style as substanceless abound in reviews of the film. 
As Dargis derisively notes, the film found an audience with fans of genre cinema, as 
evidenced in its North American DVD release under the “Tartan Asian Extreme” label. 
Even most advocates of the film only speak of the film’s style. Kim Kyung Hyun’s 
reading of Oldboy equates its stylistic “flatness” to superficiliaity then argues that the 
substanceless is purposeful critique (Kim, 2006).  
 Oldboy’s style is anything but traditional in its presentation of the narrative. The 
mise en scène is heavily stylized, especially in the art design while the acting is 
emotionally heightened, and the opposite of the subdued acting in Sympathy. The 
cinematography is also nonconventional, with frequent camera movements including 
quick zooms and jarring pans. 
 However, Oldboy’s popularity in Korea and abroad does not hinge just on its 
style. The film’s formal structure and its ultraviolent content explain its popularity and 
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provide the grounds for its negative critical reception. The form of Oldboy remains 
relatively traditional, especially in its narrative structure. 
 Oldboy (loosely based on the Japanese manga of the same title) follows the story 
of kidnapping victim and 15-year captive Oh Dae-su (Choi Min-sik). Upon his release, he 
meets a young female sushi chef, Mi-do (Gang Hye-jung) who joins him on his quest for 
answers and revenge. Lee Woo-jin (Yu Ji-tae) soon reveals himself as Dae-su’s 
kidnapper, and invites him to play a game with the truth behind Dae-su’s incarceration 
and his connection with Woo-jin as stakes. The film culminates with Woo-jin telling 
Dae-su that his sister Soo-ah (Yun Jin-seo) committed suicide in high school in part 
because of Dae-su, and that he kidnapped and held Dae-su captive as revenge. Before 
shooting himself in the head, Woo-jin informs Dae-su that Mi-do is his daughter. After 
this confrontation, Dae-su seeks out a hypnotist in order to forget his adventures, but the 
ambiguous ending suggests that Dae-su has instead forgotten his life before the events of 
the film. 
 
Formal Analysis and Reception 
 I contend that Oldboy was more successful than Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance 
because of its conventional narrative structure. Although Oldboy features two characters 
seeking revenge on one another, the plot follows the progress of Dae-su’s revenge. In 
doing so, the film is essentially a linear causal-based quest. Another reason I posit that it 
was more successful is that Oldboy seems to play with genre conventions. Critics and 
commentators have discussed all three of the Vengeance Trilogy films as being horror 
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films with some writers situating the films in the context of contemporary East Asian 
horror, another reason why they are released through Tartan Asian Extreme, which 
predominantly carries horror films. While Oldboy does have affinities with other East 
Asian horror films, it also contains many markings of an action film. For example, one 
sequence has Dae-su fighting gangsters in a hallway. Another has Dae-su fight a number 
of street thugs while there is a prolonged skirmish in Woo-jin’s penthouse. All of these 
scenes function as action set pieces. In stark contrast with Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance, 
Oldboy offers more pleasurable action sequences, making the ultraviolence more 
palatable, and the film more enjoyable. The narrative presents Dae-su’s quest for revenge 
as justifiable and thus acceptable. Dae-su’s socially acceptable violence in turn invites the 
spectator’s approval and enjoyment. Additionally, Oldboy presents its social commentary 
less pointedly, obscured by the elaborate set pieces and ultraviolent sequences.  
Furthermore, Oldboy was awarded the Grand Prix Award at the 2004 Cannes Film 
Festival, which also added to its international box office receipts. 
 The film’s pacing bolsters its action and conventional narrative arc. Oldboy 
moves more quickly than Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance. In contrast to the methodical, 
cold-blooded Dong-jin, the hot-blooded Dae-su tears through the space of Seoul and 
through the film. Editing maintains Oldbay’s pace with an average shot length of 8 
seconds and nearly 300 more shots than Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance. Furthermore, 
while the majority of shots in Sympathy are static, there is constant movement in the shots 
of Oldboy, either by the actors or by the camera. Surprisingly, commentators have noted 
of the violence in the actual editing locating the films brutality in its form as well as its 
  41 
   
narrative. And indeed, many of the cuts are jarring jump cuts, with little narrative 
motivation. 
 At first glance, it would seem that Oldboy has a conventional happy ending. The 
protagonist, Oh Dae-su seeks revenge of his kidnapping and imprisonment, eventually 
coming to a stand off with the antagonist, Lee Woo-jin. By the end of the film, his enemy 
is dead and Dae-su remains alive and with his lover/daughter Mi-do. Like Sympathy For 
Mr Vengeance’s protagonists, Dae-su has not “won.” But unlike Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance, Oldboy attributes victory to a single character, namely, Woo-jin. However, 
the film’s ambiguous ending, with Lee dead and the incestuous couple still alive makes it 
seem less tragic than Sympathy For Mr Vengence and adds to its conventional nature. 
 The ultraviolence in Oldboy, although more pleasurable than the atrocities in 
Sympathy For Mr Vengeance, retains many of the functions it had in the earlier film. It 
serves as receptacle for the film’s social commentary, is used in comedic capacities, but 
also to incite repulsion. In all of its functions, the violence is designed to affect the 
spectator. The themes from Sympathy appear in Oldboy as well and more importantly, 
just as in the previous film, those themes make ultraviolence a social critique. 
 
The Korea in Oldboy 
 In order to locate that social critique I again turn to Kim Kyung Hyun’s reading of 
Oldboy. Kim describes the South Korea in Oldboy as “unknowable” and his most 
convincing argument revolves around the film’s style. Kim cites the film’s 
cinematography as one of the elements that renders the film unknowable: 
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  This “unknowable” attitude can be seen stylistically in Park’s   
  reconstitution of the visual plane, which deliberately rejects realist depth- 
  of-field and instead opts for a flattened mise-en- scène that relies heavily  
  on wide-angle lenses and reducing the distance between the camera and its 
  subjects. These techniques, which deny any density beyond surfaces, once  
  again underscore the relentlessly superficial domain of the unknowable  
  (89). 
The cinematography of Oldboy at certain points does “deny density.” However, in 
addition to the fact that the contention that flatness connotes superificiality is 
problematic, the film’s narrative structure counters the atypical style. Subsequently, the 
bizarreness and not the superficiality (if there is indeed any) in the film’s style is 
undermined by its themes. 
 The film’s camerawork is not the only element that can be considered 
unknowable. The locations can as well. Notable examples would be Dae-su’s “jail” and 
its bizarre décor, the incredibly slick penthouse with its indoor stream, and Mi-do’s 
restaurant and apartment, none of which present themselves as particularly Korean. 
However, several spots are distinctly and unmistakably Korean. The Yongsan Electronics 
Market is a notable example. The numerous Chinese restaurants that Dae-su goes to 
while generic, still look like any Chinese restaurant found in Korea. The Number Three 
Line Subway of the Seoul Subway System as well as the numerous generic apartment 
complexes and the streets of Seoul that Dae-su navigates are also unmistakably Korean. 
These locales can only be considered “unknowable” insofar as places like them can be 
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found in nearly any Korean city and Kim does note in relation to the restaurants and their 
dumplings that ubiquity becomes anonymity and that anonymity creates the unknowable 
(100). 
 Kim notes that the provincial accent used by a number of characters is 
disembodied due to the fact that the exact location is never named (102). However, Kim 
himself notes, “the use of provincial accents clearly marks identities and boundaries that 
in turn provide a sense of “knowability” and “familiarity”” (100). While the exact city is 
not named, the accent is very distinguishably from the Kyoungsang province and again 
grounds the film in Korea. 
 While the generic streets and/or restaurants may prevent the spectator from 
knowing those specific locations, they do not contribute to an entirely unknowable space. 
They are still components of Korea, point out Korea, and tell the spectator about Korea. 
Kim also notes that the Korea in Oldboy is “a mythical, transhistorical world beyond the 
mundane realities of a legal system” due to the lack of state presence (89). The Korea in 
Oldboy is anything but transhistorical, as the film is specifically set within the years of 
1988 and 2003, a period with significant moments in Korean history, moments that the 
film explicitly references.  
History in Oldboy 
 Oldboy comments on recent South Korean history even more than Sympathy for 
Mr. Vengeance and furthermore grounds the film’s Korea as knowable. The film does 
this by including specific diegetic images of recent history. It is the television that 
presents these images. During his imprisonment, Dae-su narrates in voiceover, speaking 
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of his 15 years in captivity and how he preserved his sanity by watching television. At 
one point in the sequence the news plays in the background, announcing the 1994 
collapse of the Seongsu Bride, a major bridge in Seoul that collapsed, killing dozens.  
 As the sequence continues, we watch Dae-su in split-screen, side-by-side with 
news footage of contemporaneous Korean history beginning with 1988 and ending with 
2003. The montage begins with the arrest of former president Chun Doo-hwan on charges 
of corruption. It continues showing images of some of the proudest and promising 
moments in recent Korean history including the end of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, 
the 2000 Inter-Korea Summit, the 2002 Japan Korea World Cup, and the elections of 
former presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. These images represent the great 
hope instilled in the nation by the promise of democratization and industrialization. This 
hope is mirrored with Dae-su’s own hope. This is why the images are juxtaposed with the 
image of Dae-su digging through the wall of his prison. 
 This sequence is integral to reading Oldboy. In it the film is specifically and 
explicitly referencing Korea, but also recent Korean history. The film predominantly 
shows positive, hopeful images, but the lengthiest news segment and the only one with 
diegetic sound depict the Seongsu Bridge collapse. The incident in turn alludes to and 
brings to mind the 1995 Sampoong Department Store collapse that killed hundreds of 
people. Nancy Abelmann goes so far as to submit “collapse” as a keyword of South 
Korea in the 1990’s. She cites the collapse of the Seongsu Bridge and the Sampoong 
Department Store and a high rate of car accidents in the early 90’s. This all culminated 
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with the economic crisis in 1997. Abelmann contends that Koreans understood that it was 
a natural consequence of the country’s “rapid-fire economic development” (6). 
 The seemingly hopeful images that the sequence features also have tragic 
epilogues. Former presidents figure prominently in the sequence and this is because each 
new president brought with them new hope. Chun Doo-hwan’s presidency came with the 
end of Park Chung-hee’s authoritarian regime (Abelmann 5). Roh Tae-woo brought 
significant change with his inauguration (Robinson 168). Kim Young-sam, the first 
civilian president, began his presidency with a number of significant, popular decisions as 
well (170). Kim Dae-jung’s presidency saw the beginning and end of the Asian Financial 
Crisis or the IMF (International Monetary Fund) Crisis as well as the first Inter-Korean 
Summit. Finally, Roh Moo-hyun was elected in 2003, the year Oldboy was released. 
 Each of the last five presidents of South Korea who held office during the process 
of democratization after the assassination of Park Chung-hee, brought with them hope. 
Each of their terms ended in shame and disappointment. The Kwangju Massacre, where 
hundreds of student activists were killed and wounded, defined Chun’s presidency. Roh 
continued many of the corrupt practices of Chun’s corrupt practices (Abelmann 5). 
Shockingly, both were arrested, tried, and convicted in 1997 (Robinson 172). Near the 
end of his term, Kim Young-sam’s son was swept up in a financial crisis and Kim had an 
approval rating of four percent (Abelmann 7; Robinson 173). Kim Dae-jung finished his 
terms much in the same way, with his son in the midst of scandals and unable to 
implement many of the reform ideas he had presented (Robinson 181). And even though 
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the film was produced in 2003, sure enough Roh Moo-hyun faced accusations of 
corruption that eventually led to his suicide in 2009 (Sohn). 
 The sequence with the collapse of the Seongsu Bridge as well as the images of 
recent South Korean history, accompany Dae-su’s digging through the prison wall. Dae-
su excitedly states that he’ll be out in a month. He is released the next day. Dae-su’s 
unexpected release undermines his efforts to escape. One of Oldboy’s central motifs, 
Dae-su’s release into the world signifies his entrance into a “wider prison.” Dae-su’s 
troubles just begin upon his release and eventually lead to his destruction. Ultimately, the 
film completely dashes his hopes. Park turns Dae-su’s disappointment into an allegory 
for South Korea’s disappointment following the period between 1988 and 2002.  
The first sequence of the film also evokes historical hopes. At a police station, a 
poster of the 1988 Seoul Olympics mascot Hodori is prominently featured. The 1988 
Olympics heightened South Korea’s international profile in hopes of increasing South 
Korean prosperity. 
On his release, Dae-su notices the apartment complexes springing up everywhere, 
and the camera pans to reveal the skyline filled with these “skeleton apartments.” Dae-su 
asks why he was imprisoned for 15 years, and the allegorical answer lies in the great 
hopes of 1988 followed by 15 years of national disappointment. Oldboy recognizably 
refers to this Korea. While Dae-su’s incarceration prevents him from partaking in these 
historical events, he must navigate this Korea when he leaves his prison, the very same 
Korea that lays waste to him. 
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Park made Sympathy For Mr. Vengeance and Oldboy in 2002 and 2003 
respectively, and historical changes in Korea over those years partially account for the 
differences between the films. Park may have made Oldboy a more conventional film as a 
reaction to Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance’s commercial failure, explaining its more 
straightforward presentation and less obvious social critique. Oldboy also seems more 
aware of the international market. The inclusion of scenes from other countries’ histories 
(including Princess Diana’s death and the 9/11 terrorist attacks) in the news sequence, 
allude to this. Stylistic affinities with Kitano Takeshi’s films and ultraviolence akin to 
both Miike Takashi and Quentin Tarantino attempt to address this international audience. 
Oldboy won the Grand Prix Aware at the 2004 Cannes Film Festival, while both 
Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance and Lady Vengeance (2005) were theatrically released in 
the United States after Oldboy’s success (albeit to limited success).  
 
Central Themes 
Thematically, capitalism mediates revenge in both Oldboy and Sympathy. Woo-
jin does not capture Dae-su himself. Instead he hires a gang that runs a “hotel” for those 
who have reason to imprison someone for extended periods of time. Not unlike the organ 
dealers in Sympathy, they are running a morally despicable operation simply because a 
demand exists. Even when Dae-su goes back to the gang for help, Dae-su and the boss 
Park Cheol-woong (Oh Dal-su) express sentiments that Dae-su’s captivity was simply 
business. Furthermore Woo-jin’s massive wealth allows him to hire the gang, which the 
film explicitly acknowledges several times, not only through the dialogue (when he is 
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hiring the gang) but through the mise en scène as well. Woo-jin’s class status is signified 
through his wealth, his acquisitions (his building), his employees (willing to give life and 
limb), and his clothing. Dae-su on the other hand is initially coded as a middle class 
white-collar businessman. He wears the uniform of the businessman (the suit), flabby, 
patriarch of a standard nuclear family, and he is an alcoholic, a product of Korea’s 
corporate culture (Onishi).  
 
Class, Masculinity, and Social Mobility 
Oh Dae-su first appears at a police station, detained because of his drunken 
behavior, like a common South Korean businessman on a night out, standing in for the 
working middle class. The film presents Dae-su as flaccid, undisciplined, and unhappy; 
he is a bad friend, and a bad father. Dae-su jokes about his name and thus indicates his 
middle class status in the name itself. Dae-su’s name in Korean is 오대수, and he plays 
with words using the syllables of his name, saying it means “오늘만 대충 수습하면서 
살자.” This roughly translates to, “Let’s just get through today.”  
In stark contrast, the Dae-su released from his prison is stoic, disciplined, hard, 
strong, and capable of great violence. Changed by revenge, and the violence that 
accompanies it, Dae-su gives himself a new moniker of “Monster,” noting that he is not 
the same Oh Dae-su. Violence makes him wealthy. Now he wears designer clothes and 
carries a thick wallet. Violence also gives him mobility. Before his release, Dae-su 
appears only in confined spaces: the police station, the telephone booth, and the prison 
cell. Monster navigates not only Seoul, but also the entire country with ease. Violence 
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enhances his virility, enabling him to sleep with the much younger and attractive Mi-do. 
Finally, violence gives him means to resist against his upper class oppressor. But this 
newfound masculinity and the promises that it holds soon turn into disappointments, as 
Oldboy too ultimately reveals that resistance is futile. Dae-su eventually ends up 
shedding his new masculinity of Monster and reverting back to Dae-su. He does this 
when Woo-jin reveals his master plan and his superiority. Dae-su, losing all his stoic 
demeanor and monotone, begs at Woo-jin’s feet. 
In the early 2000’s, class was a prominent aspect to Choi Min-sik’s star image. 
Choi frequently portrayed down-and-out-of-luck middle/working class men and 
reinvigorated middle class men in various media. The depleted middle class and its 
disempowered father figures figured prominently in popular discourses of Korean 
nationalism, indirectly acknowledging disappointment in the state. E.g., in a popular 
credit card commercial, Song Hye-kyo sang the children’s song, “Cheer up daddy.” In 
another commercial, Choi’s sings, “Let’s run forward” to cheer up a friend and/or co-
worker. In 1999 Choi starred in Happy End, playing a disempowered middle-class 
husband whose wife cheats on him, while in 2001 he played an aging and marginalized 
gangster who falls in love with a dying illegal immigrant in Failan. Choi also starred in 
Crying Fist (Jumeogi unda)(2005) a film about a down-on-his-luck boxer who stages his 
triumphant return. Oldboy’s construction of Choi as a reinvigorated middle class male fits 
perfectly with his star image. 
In Oldboy, Dae-su’s new masculinity is in vain is because Lee Woo-jin holds all 
of the cards. Woo-jin outsources Dae-su’s 15-year imprisonment. He uses his extensive 
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resources to have his wife murdered He also has both Dae-su and Mi-do hypnotically 
programmed to follow his directions to the letter. He is so resourceful that he procures 
illegal firearms. While the film suggests that that the two class-coded characters 
eventually play on a level field, the narrative ultimately reveals that Dae-su was able to 
face Woo-jin because Woo-jin allowed him to. Dae-su seemingly emerges victorious. He 
learns the reason for his imprisonment. He reunites with his daughter. His enemies die 
while he lives. At the end of the film however, Dae-su wears a smile that resembles the 
smile in a grotesque painting on the wall of the prison along with the quotation 
expressing one of Oldboy’s central themes: “Laugh and the world will laugh with you. 
Cry and you will cry alone.”  
In contrast, Woo-jin acquires everything that he wanted. Not only does he already 
have financial success, he also succeeds in his master plan of revenge, fully realized and 
executed flawlessly and played out over two decades. By the end of the film, Woo-jin has 
successfully made Dae-su commit to an incestuous relationship that he cannot end 
without ruining his daughter’s life. Woo-jin has made Dae-su beg and grovel at his feet, 
and as if that weren’t enough, his victory extends beyond the grave, as Dae-su cannot 
find solace even after Woo-jin is dead, with the botched hypnosis. Woo-jin’s final words 
before he shoots himself in the head, “What do I have to live for now?” acknowledge the 
fulfillment of all his desires.  
And so, even though class divides Dae-su and Woo-jin, just as class divides 
Dong-jin and Ryu, Woo-jin clearly wins this game. Oldboy suggests that in contemporary 
Korea the upper class reigns supreme. This change in attitude reflects the widening class-
  51 
   
divide that emerged as one of the largest social problems in recent history. Characterized 
as having endless resources despite having no visible source revenue, Woo-jin represents 
the upper class and the cheabol4. Or more tellingly, his positioning as an antagonist and 
his struggle with a middle-class character expresses anxieties about the wealthy upper 
class. Kim Kyung Hyun argues that vengeance is always on a personal level in Park’s 
films and that it is “almost never against state institutions” (88). While this is true, the 
individuals are still representative of a larger group and thus the violence does enter the 
public sphere. According to the film’s logic, the upper class not only have an almost 
immeasurable amount of wealth (and time) they are beyond the law (as evidenced by the 
lack of state presence), have the ability to manipulate the middle/working class, and 
cannot be overthrown, even when someone who is inclined to do so gains the means. 
 
Ultraviolence as Mobility and Resistance 
The capacity for ultraviolence separates Oh Dae-su from Monster. The upper 
class clothing, sexual virility and stoic demeanor that identify Monster come as results of 
his potential for violence. During his imprisonment Dae-su hones himself, watching 
televised boxing matches intently, drawing a figure of a man on the wall and hitting it. 
The first time, he keels over in pain, but his body hardens over the years and he assaults 
the imaginary figure mercilessly. Freed, Dae-su tests his imaginary training. He 
effortlessly dispatches a number of street urchins. When he reaches Woo-jin’s penthouse 
he puts down Woo-jin’s “dogs” quickly and efficiently. In the most revealing sequence 
                                                
4 Chaebols are Korean conglomerates that emerged in the wake of economic growth in 
the 1960’s. Includes Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo (Robinson 193). 
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Dae-su, formerly an ordinary office worker fights off and defeats nearly twenty hardened 
gangsters by himself. This sequence not only demonstrates Dae-su’s skill, it also portrays 
his mobility. 
In the sequence where Dae-su fights off the gangsters, he once again finds himself 
in a confined space but demonstrates how he has changed, in contrast with the scenes in 
the police station, telephone booth, and cell. Here, we see Dae-su able to navigate the 
space through violence. The camera follows Dae-su in a single take as he moves to and 
fro in the hallway, fighting back legions of adversaries with a hammer and his fists. By 
the end of the sequence, only Dae-su is left standing. 
 Not only is he able to fight his way through dangerous locales, he also has the 
money to navigate various locales of the country and is shown doing so. During his 
search for clues Oh goes to a pricey Japanese restaurant, the Yongsan Electronics Market, 
numerous Chinese restaurants, a hair salon, and his far away alma mater. Finally, he 
enters the heavily restricted penthouse of the wealthy Lee. Before his transformation, 
Dae-su’s movements are constantly restricted. Police officers constantly restrain his 
flailing limbs; the telephone booth and his best friend Joo-Hwan (Ji Dae-han) confine 
him; gangsters constantly monitor and regulate his movements in prison. Dae-su’s 
mobility comes as a result of his violence, and as in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance, it is 
just one site where violence and capitalism intersect. 
Citizenship, the National Body, and Capitalism 
In Oldboy too, the citizens build the nation by allowing the commodification of 
their bodies. Oldboy also features the body in peril, characterizing bodies as lacking 
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integrity. Subject to frequent assault and mutilations, bodies in the film provide many 
opportunities for bloodshed and dismemberment. In addition, characters make deals using 
body parts throughout the film. One of the first instances of such commerce in bodies 
comes when Dae-su seeks revenge on the gang that runs the hotel. Dae-su uses a hammer 
to extract Park Cheol-woong’s teeth, saying that one tooth stands for one year of 
imprisonment. Woo-jin cuts Cheol-woong’s hand off and gives it to Dae-su as a present. 
Woo-jin buys Cheol-woong a building to compensate him for his hand. Dae-su also 
attempts to barter a body part with Woo-jin. Apologizing for his part in Soo-ah’s death 
and begging for forgiveness – as well as accepting his place beneath Woo-jin and his 
class position – Dae-su offers his tongue and cuts it off himself. 
If Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance presents the body as commodity, Oldboy presents 
bodies as legitimate and regularly traded currency. Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance 
emphasizes the demand for bodies. Oldboy emphasizes the use of body parts in exchange.  
Time and time again, characters fall back to taking or giving body parts in negotiations. 
Dae-su does not plan to take nor want Cheol-woong’s teeth. Woo-jin does not want 
Cheol-woong’s hand (although Dae-su does), and Woo-jin does not want Dae-su’s 
tongue. However in each of these situations the characters decide to turn to the body. And 
in each of the situations the transaction is “successful.” Kim situates this trend within the 
context of contemporary Confucian society: 
 Debunking the mantra of the Confucian society, which posits the   
  familial collective and consequently the nation as being organically  
  linked to individual bodies, the bodies in Park Chan-wook’s films are  
  54 
   
  regarded as commodifiable, their organs usually quantifiable in terms of  
  monetary value that can be bought and sold (98). 
However, Kim also argues that Cheol-woong’s willing mutilation is tarnishing the act of 
sacrifice as activism in recent Korean history (one such act is Peng’s self-mutilation in 
Sympathy)(98). By doing so Kim is connecting the films with Korean history and 
contradicting his argument of the “unknowable”. Addtionally, this argument is not as 
prominent as the film’s argument concerning the place of the body in capitalist Korea. 
Consumption also plays a part in the film. On numerous occasions Dae-su states 
that when he finds Woo-jin, no one will ever be able to find his body because Dae-su will 
chew him up, demonstrating once again the close relationship between the body as 
commodity and consumption of said commodity. When Dae-su is released he goes to a 
Japanese restaurant. Dae-su tells the chef, Mi-do, “I want to eat something live,” And he 
proceeds to devour a living squid. Dae-su’s newfound masculinity and class identity 
makes the pricey upper-class cuisine affordable. On the contrary, when Dae-su was still 
in the midst of his transformation, he only eats the Chinese dumplings fed to him during 
his imprisonment, a food of the working lower class. 
The ultra wealthy executive, Woo-jin deals in human life, as well as bodies. Woo-
jin controls the deaths and lives of other characters. In one sequence we see that his own 
life is not exempt. When Dae-su first confronts Woo-jin and threatens him with a 
hammer, Woo-jin relates that his heart needed a pacemaker. He also lies to Dae-su, 
telling him he asked the foreign doctor to install a remote control suicide switch. Woo-jin 
says he told the shocked doctor, “I’ll give you $100,000 more!” The spectator, and Dae-
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su are both led to believe that Woo-jin indeed had the remote control installed and that 
such an operation was possible because of the close nature of life and capitalism.  
Woo-jin’s superiority manifests itself in the fact that although he is a capitalist 
that deals in the body, he is not a victim of the trade like Cheol-woong. He simply 
observes, above the others, and reaps benefits. At his base of operations, Woo-jin 
observes Seoul from above, its citizens barely visible and inconsequential. Oldboy’s 
characterization of its antagonist as an evil character thriving in and representing a 
contemptible society functions as a critique of capitalism. 
Woo-jin’s evil can run unchecked because in Oldboy’s Korea, the state plays a 
minimal role. Whereas Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance and Lady Vengeance feature 
detectives, a minor character and a supporting character respectively, Oldboy has no such 
role. Kim notes that the lack of state presence signifies that the main characters operate 
outside of the law, and that it is to suggest a “mythical, transhistorical world” and that 
Oldboy follows along Philip Weinstein’s ideas of modernist narratives that are “beyond 
knowing”. Kim continues, arguing that the lack of state presence is a strategy so that the 
film may withstand “objective mapping and mastery” and may subsequently become 
unknowable (89). The lack of state presence does serve to present how Dae-su and Woo-
jin operate outside of the law, but it does not function to render the film unknowable.  
The film begins in a police station and the police officers are faceless, 
disembodied voices that serve only to repress Dae-su, who then represents the working 
class. While they use time and energy in containing Dae-su, both Woo-jin and even 
Monster go completely unchecked in their numerous acts of sadism throughout the rest of 
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the film. Woo-jin’s elite upper-class status grants him immunity, and Dae-su is 
temporarily granted the same exemption because of the upper class markings Woo-jin 
gives him. Ultimately then, according to the film, the state serves only to inhibit the 
middle/working class. The upper class on the other hand proceeds without caution, as 
does all of the violence that happens in the name of capitalism and industrial growth. 
Because for the film, this is the reality of South Korea, a reality that puts national growth 
ahead of human life, and indeed, requires human life. 
As with the other films in the Vengeance Trilogy, this weakness of the body 
allegorizes the weak national body. Rampant violence comes to the citizens of Oldboy’s 
Korea because of the state’s weakness. Upper class perpetrators kill men and women with 
abandon and the higher the perpetrator’s social standing, the more unrestrained the 
violence becomes. Bodies and violence play such a large part in the economy that the 
body must be sacrificed. 
One of the images of Korea in Oldboy is the image of the 2002 Japan Korea 
World Cup. Shin Gi-wook notes that on June 11th 2002, hundreds of thousands of 
Koreans could be found in front of Seoul City Hall, and that twenty thousand Korean 
Americans were at the Staple Center in Los Angeles (1). He continues, noting the 
significance that the World Cup had to Koreans all over the world. A survey in July 
revealed that 75 percent of the participants felt “strong pride”. Shin’s studies reveal 
similar results, with national pride and nationalism stemming not in location, but blood. 
In 2002, the year before Oldboy’s release, the country was united in its support of 
the national soccer team. It was one country, one people, and one bloodline. Oldboy 
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features one image from that time. And while it shares the same preoccupation with 
blood, it is with the blood that is shed, not shared.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONTEMPORARY WOMAN’S ROLE IN LADY VENGEANCE 
Sympathy for Lady Vengeance is an ironic film. It is not the film’s content though 
that is responsible for the film’s irony. Instead, it is how the film was handled and 
received. Lady Vengeance departs from the first two films of the Vengeance Trilogy, 
shifting its main focus from class inequity to gender inequity, and attempts to address the 
plight of the woman in contemporary South Korean society. However, attitudes towards 
the film, both in the film’s marketing as well as the film’s reception only served to further 
illustrate those inequities.  
The reason lies with the film’s publicity. Some dealt with the fact that it was the 
latest film from Park Chan-wook. There was also some coverage because it was the third 
and final film of the Vengeance Trilogy. But media coverage also diverged from topics 
such as the films’ ultraviolent and taboo content, and the performances and instead 
focused on the casting of Lady Vengeance. At the center was the notion that the star Lee 
Young-ae was an unusual choice for the project and that the film was an unusual choice 
for Lee. This was because the beautiful Lee had mostly starred in melodramas and 
romances. In essence, she was too pretty for the film. 
This focus on the exterior did not end with the casting, it also centered on a very 
specific element of the film: her make-up. In the film, Lee as the title character Geum-ja 
wears bright red eye shadow around her eyes. It is a prominent motif that is not only 
visually striking but also significantly different from contemporary trends in women’s 
make-up in South Korea. Advertisements at the time made sure to emphasize “Geum-ja’s 
way of make-up.” Iope, the manufacturer of the make-up used in the film, held several 
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events where they sold the make-up and demonstrated its proper use (as it is done in the 
film) in popular metropolitan areas of Seoul (Choi). This preoccupation with the exterior 
illustrates practices of gender inequity and the issue of physical appearance and women 
in South Korea. Ironically, this is exactly what Sympathy for Lady Vengeance is about. 
 
Central Themes 
Constructions of Femininity 
The third and final film of the Vengeance Trilogy, Lady Vengeance too is 
concerned with South Korean society. The original Korean title of Lady Vengeance offers 
insight into the film. Originally titled Chinjeolhan Geum-jassi (친절한 금자씨), the title 
literally translates to “Kind Ms. Geum-ja.” Through the Korean and international title, the 
spectator is offered a dichotomy, that of Lady Vengeance and of Kind Ms. Geum-ja, and 
Lady Vengeance too charts the trek of Lee Geum-ja and her transformation. The film 
begins with Geum-ja in prison, serving a sentence for the kidnapping and murder of a 
young boy. Geum-ja was wrongly convicted, agreeing to turn herself in for the real 
murderer, Mr. Baek (Choi Min-sik). She did this as he threatened to kill her newborn 
daughter Jenny (Kwon Yea-young). It is during her sentence that she picks up two 
monikers, “Kind Ms. Geum-ja” and “Witch”. The first she earns because she so      
selflessly helps the other inmates. The second, Geum-ja earns through her murdering 
another inmate, the prison’s resident bully. All of these deeds were part of her preparation 
for revenge. Once released from prison Geum-ja seeks out all those who were indebted to 
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her during her sentence and with the help of the families of Baek’s victims, she has her 
vengeance. 
Lady Vengeance’s concern with women is evidenced in its large cast. It is a 
predominantly female cast. A bulk of the film takes place in a women’s penitentiary and 
while it is Geum-ja who has agency, the other inmates of the prison have narrative 
relevance as well. Four primary supporting characters play significant parts in her 
scheme: Oh Su-hee (Ra Mi-ran), Kim Yang-hee (Seo Young-ju), Park Yi-jeong (Lee 
Seung-shin), and Woo So-young (Kim Bu-sun). Each character serves time along with 
Geum-ja, is aided by Geum-ja in some way, and helps her in her plot. Each character is 
introduced through flashbacks of their first encounters with Geum-ja. 
Oh Su-hee is in prison for adultery. It is unknown whether or not the male party 
was convicted, but it is assumable that he was not. Kim Yang-hee is a prostitute who 
killed her pimp. Park Yi-jeong, who has the largest role in Geum-ja’s plot, is in prison for 
fraud. The bully of the cell, the Witch (Go Su-hee) calls her a “꽃뱀” (Gotbehm). 
Literally translated, “꽃뱀” means “Flower snake” and the term refers to female scam 
artists who generally have sex with men before robbing them. Woo So-young is a 
peculiar character that deviates from the other supporting characters. She is in prison for 
robbing banks with her husband. She is not an independent woman like the other inmates, 
and furthermore she is coded as being happily married. Her crime and her position do not 
directly relate to the woman’s place in contemporary South Korea. 
This is not the case with the remaining three inmates. The film only shows a 
woman being held accountable for adultery. This is reflective of the dominant acceptance 
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of sexual promiscuity on the part of males, but not females. The prostitute, Yang-hee, 
further demonstrates this point. A government study in 2003 found that Korea’s sex 
industry had a profit margin of 26 trillion won in 2002 with 260,000 women employed 
(Moon). Furthermore, prostitution is often considered to be a “necessary” part of the 
workplace and is often knowingly neglected. On the other hand, the few practices that 
cater to women are stigmatized and condemned. Yang-hee is in prison for killing her 
pimp, a man who was exploiting her by selling her to other men. And yet she is the one 
who is punished. Yi-jeong is an extension of that. She is able to operate within her chosen 
“occupation” because there is a demand. In other words, she can scam men using sex 
because there is a steady supply of men looking for promiscuous encounters5. Yi-jeong’s 
part in Geum-ja’s plan has her being exploited again, as she plays the part of a traditional 
housewife to the patriarchal figure. 
Geum-ja is the ultimate victim. Not only does she serve the longest term, Geum-ja 
is also innocent. Geum-ja’s misfortune begins when she is a teenager. Faced with an 
accidental pregnancy in high school, Geum-ja turns to Baek, her former student teacher. 
The film characterizes the pregnancy not only as being a problem, but her problem as 
Jenny’s father is completely absent; when Baek asks her about the father Geum-ja 
completely disregards him. Baek takes her in and it is evident that that she must give into 
his sexual desires. This not only points to perceptions of teenage pregnancy and single 
parent pregnancy, but also to the issue of underage sex, solicited and otherwise. Baek’s 
                                                
5 Prostitution is illegal in South Korea but persists due to a number of reasons, partially 
because businesses have become increasingly creative in avoiding laws and also because 
of the government consciously neglecting the practice. 
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exploitation continues as he frames the helpless Geum-ja for the kidnap and murder of 
Won-mo. After a brief media circus (that focuses on the young age and beauty of the 
perpetrator), Geum-ja goes to prison. The media and indeed the country have already 
made up their mind and the film entirely skips the trial.  
Geum-ja is also a woman who is denied her right as a mother. Not only does Baek 
hold Jenny ransom, he also puts her up for adoption while Geum-ja is in jail. When 
Geum-ja is released she seeks out information on Jenny at the adoption agency but is 
denied due to confidentiality policies. 
Like Dong-jin and Dae-su before her, Geum-ja too undergoes a transformation in 
her identity. The first identity, “Kind Ms. Geumja” is when she is in prison. People know 
Geum-ja for her sweet smile and her kind deeds. She helps the constantly antagonized 
Su-hee and Yi-jeong by killing the first Witch. She helps So-young by giving her a 
kidney. She is active at the prison church and takes care of an elder invalid inmate, a 
crazed North Korean spy that everyone avoids. She is beautiful and she is kind, and 
through these virtues Geum-ja gets what she wants. 
The narrative goes out of it way to point out Geum-ja’s transformation. People 
give her the moniker “Witch” when they find out that she killed the original Witch. The 
transformation happens in earnest when she is released from prison. She wears flashy 
clothes, does the iconic eye makeup, and wears high heels. She rarely smiles, speaks in a 
monotone, and is sexually aggressive. The change is noticed; several times the other 
characters either comment on how much she has changed, or ask her why she chooses to 
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wear makeup the way she does. In one instance, she simply replies, “Because I didn’t 
want to look kind.” 
This is an explicit reference of her “Kind Ms. Geum-ja” persona, as well as a 
conscious and aware rejection of that persona. This also shows how Geum-ja’s 
transformation is not only more pronounced than those of Dong-jin and Dae-su, but also 
more calculated. While Dong-jin’s new masculinity through violence seems to be more 
naturalistic and an effect of the events surrounding him and Dae-su’s transformation into 
“Monster” a bit more deliberate yet still unavoidable, Geum-ja’s change is also partially 
an unveiling of the façade. In other words, she does not necessarily change into “The 
Witch” so much as she had purposefully assumed the guise of “Kind Ms. Geum-ja.” 
The help of the other inmates is integral to Geum-ja’s plot. And the best way for 
her to gain the aid of those inmates was for her to ingratiate herself with them, and the 
best way for her to do this was with her beauty and benevolence. What the diegesis is 
essentially arguing is that these are the two main attributes that a woman needs in order to 
gain what she needs. Geum-ja simply was what was expected of her: a good woman. 
Incidentally, this image is not far removed from Lee’s star image: quiet, reserved, 
beautiful, and kind. 
When Baek first comes face to face with the woman whose life he has ruined, the 
first thing he says is, “Why would you do your eyes like that?” Baek is not only showing 
disdain for Geum-ja’s eye shadow, but also the woman that she has become, a far cry 
from the subservient, weak young woman she was before prison, and the quiet, 
kindhearted woman that she was in prison. She is now a dominant strong figure that 
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commands the attention of all around her, male and female, gains the means and mobility 
to navigate the space of Korea, and to provide for a new sexual appetite. The new violent 
femininity is beneficial for Geum-ja. 
Geum-ja’s transformed identity of “The Witch” is coded as being distinctly 
feminine. This is a considerable contrast compared to Lee’s other collaboration with Park 
in J.S.A. In J.S.A. Lee plays Major Sophie E. Jean, the Swiss-Korean Major assigned with 
investigating the skirmish between South and Korean soldiers. In J.S.A. Lee’s Jean is an 
asexual character, a plot device there to offer cohesion to the narrative. Lee does not wear 
much make-up, speaks in a succinct, direct manner, and wears a stark military uniform 
throughout the film. Her gender neither adds nor detracts from the role and indeed the 
character was originally male. Geum-ja’s gender on the other hand, is emphasized time 
and time again, in her physical appearance but also her demeanor.  
The film’s construction of femininity and what it considers to be “feminine” is 
complicated if not problematic. If we consider the film’s assignment of importance then 
we can consider that Geum-ja is foremost as she is the protagonist, and then we can 
consider “The Witch” to be the more valid identity as it is “real.” Regardless of Lee’s 
inherent femininity, the character’s gender is otherwise nondescript: Geum-ja (Witch) is 
reserved, cold, and taciturn. She is capable of great violence and seems to show little if 
any emotion. The initial marker of Geum-ja’s gender is in her love and devotion to her 
daughter Jenny. The other, more problematic indicator is in her preoccupation with 
physical appearances. 
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After Geum-ja’s release, the church group that had aided her throughout her 
sentence is there to greet her. Geum-ja’s sentence ends in winter, and she exits the prison 
wearing the outdated summer dress she wore when she was first incarcerated. This 
prompts the preacher to scold her asking her why she didn’t wear the coat that he had 
sent her. From the beginning we see Geum-ja’s concern with her appearance. In another 
moment the film shows Geum-ja doing her make-up. In another she asks Yang-hee – who 
is offering her a place to stay and clothes to wear – if she has any high heels. When she 
goes to So-young and Su-hee who make her a gun and the plaque that will go on the 
handle of the gun, the women ask her why she is so set on such a strange design. Geum-
ja’s answer is, “It has to be pretty…” 
Beauty is one of the elements that are central to society’s construction of the 
woman, and Geum-ja plays on this in her “Kind Ms. Geum-ja” persona. But while her 
“Witch” persona refutes nearly everything else about her earlier identity, she retains a 
fixation with outer beauty. In that sense, Geum-ja even in her Witch persona is 
stereotypical in her depiction of femininity. She is like a post-vengeance Dong-jin but 
with a penchant for pretty things. This is problematic, but could be commentary on the 
fact that Geum-ja, or rather Lee had to be pretty as well. In other words, even though 
Lady Vengeance is a blood-splattered revenge film, it is a blood-spattered revenge film 
starring a woman, and because it stars a woman, it was only commercially viable if the 
lead were physically attractive. 
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Constructions of Patriarchal Masculinity 
This is the reality that women face in the Korea of Lady Vengeance. Women are 
marginalized, disempowered, and relegated to specific roles that benefit the patriarchal 
male. Choi Min-sik who played Oh Dae-su in Oldboy, returns to the Vengeance Trilogy 
to play Mr. Baek, the antagonist of Lady Vengeance. Baek is a successful English teacher 
at private language schools and also a serial murderer who has killed at least five 
children.  
Mr. Baek plays three different roles that are all related to contemporary social 
issues. He is the capitalist, the patriarchal figure, and the private educator. The 
Vengeance Trilogy returns to the issue of kidnapping and references Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance when Geum-ja speaks the same dialogue that Yeong-mi does, saying that 
there is “good kidnapping” and “bad kidnapping”. Baek is a bad kidnapper. He kidnaps 
children and kills them purely for personal gain and pleasure. While Won-mo the first 
victim was for the money, the subsequent killings were not financially motivated. Baek 
taped the killings and seems to be enjoying himself in the tapes. This is not to say that 
there isn’t a capitalist thread to Baek’s crimes. In another sequence the victims’ families, 
who had all paid the ransoms ask why someone without any children would need so 
much money. Geum-ja answers that he was planning on buying a yacht, much to the 
shock of the families. 
Baek’s patriarchal role comes in earnest through his marriage to Yi-jeong. In a 
number of sequences the film cuts to Baek at home. Anytime the film shows Baek at 
home he is eating silently with his wife. This highlights the importance of meals, but 
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more importantly, the role of the wife in ensuring that a meal is prepared. In one 
sequence, Yi-jeong hesitantly asks Baek for permission to meet her friends. She assures 
him that dinner will be ready for him when he gets back. Later Yi-jeong tells Geum-ja 
that she must hurry home because Baek will be home soon and that she must fix him 
dinner. Baek’s sexuality also defines him. In the same sequence where Yi-jeong asks him 
for permission, Baek pauses mid-meal and walks over to his wife. He silently gestures for 
her to rise and she obediently does, setting dishes aside. Baek undoes his zipper and 
proceeds to have brutal intercourse with Yi-jeong. He finishes, pats her on the back and 
walks back to his seat and finishes his meal. In Lady Vengeance, this is the woman’s role 
in the patriarchal household, to provide food and sex. 
What is problematic to Baek’s role as a patriarchal figure is that he is not a father. 
When asked if Baek has his own children, Geum-ja notes that he is sterile and does not. 
This could be connected to the theme of the absence of the father figure that the film 
conveys through the absence of Jenny’s biological father and also the prominence of 
Geum-ja’s motherhood. It could also be a commentary on the patriarchal figure as being 
a non-existent father in contemporary society. In either case, even though Baek himself is 
not a father, he is still obviously coded as representative of patriarchy, and this is also 
connected to his role as an educator. 
A Korean proverb states, “The king, the teacher, and the leader are one.” 
Education has historically been a primary concern in Korean culture, and this is true now 
more than ever. In his reintroduction Baek is with his students, singing and dancing to the 
nursery rhyme, “Are you sleeping?” Baek also translates for Geum-ja when she talks to 
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her daughter Jenny. His modus operandi is choosing his victims from his schools, and 
promptly moving to another school after killing the children; this is how he was never 
implicated. 
Baek is a very specific type of educator. He does not teach at elementary, middle, 
and high schools, and he does not teach at college. Baek is an English teacher at a private 
language school for children. He is a despicable character with no redeeming qualities 
and elicits no sympathy from the spectator. Through Baek, the film’s construction of 
education is one that decries English education as well as private education and early 
education. 
Baek chose his victims from his schools because he knew that they came from 
wealthy families. The high tuition is further emphasized when a victim’s sister says that 
her family was only able to pay by both parents working full-time. This also speaks of the 
necessity of private education and the lengths that families will go to. Furthermore, 
Baek’s ability to find at least five different schools speaks of the high demand. 
The victims’ families play a crucial part in the film. The families represent the 
upper class, and this is evident not only in the tasteful clothes they wear, but in the way 
that they are introduced. The families all enter the film when Geum-ja gathers them at an 
abandoned school to decide Baek’s fate. The film introduces the families initially by their 
cars, panning slowly across the expensive foreign cars lined up in front of the school. 
Foreign cars are one of the signifiers of the upper class in South Korea, and this instantly 
identifies them as such, especially when contrasted against the lone domestic car, a beat 
up truck. The truck introduces the single working class family. And even though the 
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upper class families invite the spectator’s sympathies, there is a hint of animosity pointed 
towards them. 
In one sequence the middle class family’s daughter gossips about one of the other 
mothers, commenting on how she took off her nice boots (so they wouldn’t get dirty) and 
how she is inappropriately dressed for a rather dark occasion. She says that she can’t 
understand how someone could do that in such a situation and the question seems to be 
posed as a legitimate one. Later, after they kill Baek, the families return to Geum-ja’s 
bakery. After a few moments of mourning and contemplation, the families get down to 
brass tacks: money. While it is the working class character that asks Geum-ja if the 
ransoms found in Baek’s house will be returned, she is coded as a more sympathetic 
character; the film notes the vast amount of trouble that her family went through after the 
kidnapping. This applies less to the rest of the families who seem to be doing fine yet 
promptly follow suit and hand Geum-ja their account numbers too. The inclusion of the 
scene indicts the victims’ families and suggests that money can and will help them 
overcome their grief and even fill the places of their lost children. 
 
The Historical Context 
Education in Korea 
How does this Korea depicted in Lady Vengeance correspond to the recent history 
of contemporary Korea? Michael J. Seth summarizes the country’s relationship to 
education in the last few decades as such:  
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The fever-pitch obsession with education has been a fixed feature of South 
Korean society. Most of the striking products of this obsession – the 
enormous costs of education, the sacrifices families were prepared to 
make to meet them, “examination mania,” and the nearly universal drive 
for high-status degrees – remained unaltered at the end of the twentieth 
century (224). 
 Seth goes on to note education as being deeply connected to the process of 
democratization as well as the country’s increasing economic prosperity (224). Those 
high-status degrees that Seth mentions are related to the close proximity of Confucian 
values and education; this is because of the idea that higher education at prestigious 
institutes instantly leads to status (251-252). Jobs at conglomerates such as Samsung and 
LG have become more and more coveted, and degrees from the top ranked universities in 
the country are considered the fast track to such jobs. While entrance into universities has 
long been a priority, competition has risen and with it the need for private education with 
a special focus on English. There is an economic dimension to this new focus as it is part 
of a motion to internationalize education for “English was both the language of 
democratic nations and the medium of global commerce, science, technology, and culture 
(234). 
This all takes a toll on parents, compared to personal income, South Korean 
education “was possibly the world’s costliest educational system” (Seth 172). This is 
because students and their families predominantly covered the expenses themselves (as 
opposed to the state). A significant part of those costs went to private tutoring and after 
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school lessons (186). Parents use millions in South Korean won a month on private 
education and the consensus has become that it is impossible to procure a future for your 
children without private education. Parents are not only spending more money on their 
children, they’re also starting earlier. More and more programs and schools are targeting 
children with the base age lowering. The sharpest rise in educational costs in the 90’s was 
for elementary school students with English education seeing the highest rise (188). This 
is what Lady Vengeance is addressing. It allegorizes the current situation with private 
education and poses the question, what exactly does it cost? At least according to the 
film, it may cost the child. 
 
Gender Inequity in Korea 
The situation with gender inequity is equally difficult. The country has made 
progress in social rights, with the 90’s marking an aggressive movement by women to 
gain equal rights (Shin Ki-Young 2006 in Robinson 177). However, the struggle for 
progress is as slow as it is ongoing and even today South Korea is a nation where female 
fetuses are commonly aborted (Seth 245). According to Cal Clark and Rose J. Lee, a two-
fold disappointment for women characterizes recent history in Asia: the process of 
industrialization and democratization. Neither has improved the status of women (9). 
L.H.M. Ling posits that the process of democratization in East Asia has been a “hyper-
masculine” process that has ended up with women marginalized and “rationalized as 
invisible (housewives), cheap (factory girls), expendable (migrant workers), and/or 
available (sex workers)” (170, 173). According to Ling, modernization is hyper-
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masculine in response to a historical characterization by the West of Asia as being 
feminine and weak. This is why the woman’s role during the process has been defined as 
“the good wife, wise mother” (hyonmo yangcho)(175).  
Confucius thought has changed with the times but for the most part the woman is 
still defined in relation to the man. In their volume discussing Confucianism’s role in 
modern Asia, Daniel A. Bell and Hahm Chaibong agree that, “The domination of men 
over women seems to be one of the defining characteristics of Confucian theory and 
practice” (20). On another note, Ling points out that Confucianism is not the sole thread 
to contemporary East Asian culture, noting influences of Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, 
Taoism, and Shinto as well. However, she does remark that one strain persists: patriarchy 
(Ling 175). Whereas the patriarchal male’s role is that of father, leader, and teacher, the 
woman is still mostly relegated to the role of wife and mother. Now, even though the 
woman’s place in the workplace has expanded, there are still different standards. One 
such example is that more and more women are seeking plastic surgery because it will 
help their chances in job hunting but also in the workplace itself. 
Conversely, Mahmood Yousefi argues that while gender inequity still exists 
within the country, women have as well benefitted from Korea’s economic prosperity, 
noting that “Women in Korea today are more educated, healthier, and bear fewer children 
than they did thirty years ago” (57). Yousefi goes on to chart the progress in education, 
growth, and health care, and looks to issues of employment and earnings for women in 
Korea. In particular, Yousefi notes that within the 173 nations in the UN, the 1993 
Human Development Index indicated that the gender-disparity-adjusted ranking placed 
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South Korea at #28 (62). This is an issue that I will briefly address in the conclusion of 
this thesis, but the objective reality of contemporary South Korea, while important, is 
tricky and debatable. What remains central to this study is that the films of the Vengeance 
Trilogy do not agree with these contentions.     
On first glance, state presence is a tricky issue in Lady Vengeance. Like Sympathy 
for Mr. Vengeance, Lady Vengeance introduces state presence in the form of a detective, 
Detective Choi (Nam Il-woo). Choi is sympathetic to Geum-ja, and knows that she is 
innocent. In one key sequence Geum-ja is forced to reenact the murder in front of the 
press and the victim’s family. After tying the dummy up it is her turn to smother it with a 
pillow but she does not know what color pillow she is supposed to use. Choi sees this and 
points to his watchband, clueing her into the color of the murder weapon: orange. Even 
though Choi knows the truth, he is just one man who is unable to help Geum-ja; she was 
doomed to begin with. 
Choi is presented less as a representative of the state, and more as a sympathetic 
character who is disenchanted with the state and the country. Despite Geum-ja’s 
innocence, she wrongfully goes to jail. Other than Choi, the state is unaccounted for as 
there is no trial and there are no correctional officers in prison. After she is released, Choi 
decides to help Geum-ja in her revenge. When Geum-ja presents him with unequivocal 
evidence that Beak is guilty, Choi goes along with Geum-ja’s plan of leaving his fate in 
the victims’ families’ hands. The families decide to not give Baek over to the authorities, 
demonstrating their own lack of faith in the judicial system. Choi, the disillusioned state 
official, goes along with this eschewing of a fair trial, and actually aids in the murder. 
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Ultraviolence as Legitimate Resistance 
Ultraviolence is the tool that makes this all possible. Like Dong-jin and Dae-su 
before her, ultraviolence is what gives Geum-ja her mobility. It is her first act of violence 
that precedes her release into the world from the confines of prison. Geum-ja roams 
through a wider space after this act. There is an added dimension to Geum-ja’s social 
mobility in the fact that she gains connections. In addition to her numerous good deeds, it 
is an act of murder that gains her allies who facilitate more ultraviolence. 
Lady Vengeance also adds an extra dimension to the issue of social mobility first 
seen in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance. Both films show that savagery can be a way to kill 
mobility. In Sympathy, Dong-jin cuts Ryu’s Achilles tendons in order to stop him from 
escaping. In Lady Vengeance Geum-ja shoots Baek (who is already bound and gag) in the 
toe. There is no possibility for Baek to escape and this marks the beginning of the end for 
him. While he too has had social mobility and financial success through brutality, Geum-
ja’s act has negated his own upward trajectory.  
Ultraviolence is once again a means of social resistance. Geum-ja’s violence gives 
her the means to resist against the oppressive patriarchal figure. Likewise, aggression 
gives the upper class the means to resist against the parasitic capitalist who has taken 
their money and their children. What sets apart Lady Vengeance from Sympathy and 
Oldboy is the fact that this new femininity and social mobility is not overturned and not 
futile; instead it goes off without a hitch. 
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The body is still the target of ultraviolence in Lady Vengeance, and it is still 
commodified. In the first instance, Geum-ja is able to gain Woo So-young’s assistance by 
giving her a commodity, once again a kidney. In the second, Geum-ja goes to the parents 
of Won-mo, the first victim, and offers her pinky for their forgiveness. The voiceover 
states that Geum-ja was ready and willing to give all her fingers in exchange for their 
forgiveness. It then immediately notes that Geum-ja spent all of her savings from her 
time in prison on surgery, once again explicitly linking the body and issues of money. 
Finally the film returns to issues first brought up in Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance with 
commerce of the whole body, or kidnapping. 
While Lady Vengeance is concerned with the same issues as Sympathy for Mr. 
Vengeance and Oldboy, the conclusion it reaches makes it a more challenging film within 
the trilogy’s schema. This is because despite its critique, Lady Vengeance is not about 
dashed hope, but possible hope. Because Geum-ja has her revenge and gains redemption 
(as evidenced in the last sequence), the film eschews any sort of bleakness in relation to 
the reality of women in contemporary Korea, and instead presents a hopeful situation that 
is more aligned to the discourses of nationalism that it is critiquing. It must be noted 
however that even though the film may be demonstrating its own gender bias in its 
differences from the other two films, the Of course even though While the film could 
simply be offering a more hopeful nationalism in order to reinvigorate female spectators, 
it is my contention that the thematic inconsistencies (in relation to the other films) make 
it problematic and demonstrative of its own gender bias. 
In his review of Lady Vengeance for Sight and Sound, Roser Clarke states:  
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Up to that point, however, Lady Vengeance is a film of minimal 
seriousness, full of pratfalls and in-jokes: it's almost as if Park can't bring 
himself to portray the vengeance of a woman in the same stark way he 
used with men in the first two parts of his trilogy (68). 
There are a number of reasons that this could be argued, beginning with the “team 
dynamic” of the film. Unlike Dong-jin, Ryu, and Dae-su, who all embark on their quests 
alone or with little aid, Geum-ja initially has four allies. She then adds Choi the detective. 
Eight other people commit the actual murder. It is almost as if Geum-ja is incapable of 
pulling off her elaborate scheme, especially the physical part. The sequence where she 
manhandled in one sequence by Baek’s hired assassins supports this. Geum-ja manages 
to dispatch the killers but it is after she is overpowered, and this in itself is linked to the 
next issue. 
 Geum-ja is the only protagonist of the Vengeance Trilogy to use a gun. While the 
others use bats, knives, and hammers, Geum-ja is the only protagonist who does not use a 
melee weapon. Her use of firearm could be a play on the long-standing consideration of 
the gun as a phallic symbol, but it seems more to be a testament to the film’s bias towards 
her femininity. Geum-ja is simply physically weaker, and able to kill only with a weapon 
that compensates for that weakness. 
 Geum-ja is also the only protagonist to commit the perfect crime. While the film 
ends with an ambiguous smile (not unlike Oldboy), the context of the smile undermines 
the ambiguity. Geum-ja has vanquished her foe, she is with her daughter, and she has 
planted her face in a cake shaped like tofu. This gesture contrasts to when she is initially 
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released from prison and offered tofu. The offering of tofu to a released convict is a 
motion that represents redemption, and one that is an oath to lead a “clean, white” life. 
While Geum-ja turns down the tofu near the beginning of the film, she fully commits to it 
at the end, signaling a happy ending. The fact that she does not meet a gruesome fate has 
two issues: first is that the film does not present a thesis of dashed hope and futility that 
the other two films had. The second is that the film offers hope that is unrealistic in the 
narrative logic of the films. Furthermore, the film also denies Geum-ja bodily mutilation 
like Dong-jin, Ryu, and Dae-su. It is interpretable that Geum-ja is spared a similar fate 
because she is a woman, and the mutilation of a woman is the one line that the films 
refuse to cross. 
 Finally, the last issue that Sympathy for Lady Vengeance has is Geum-ja’s 
capacity as a mother. While the film denounces the woman’s role in patriarchal Korea, it 
still upholds the ideal that a woman should be a mother. Geum-ja is ruthless and 
unrelenting as an independent woman and as a lover but she yields when her daughter 
Jenny is involved. Geum-ja is a dedicated mother, concerned with what is best for her 
daughter – she decides that Jenny should go back to her foster parents in Australia – and 
unable to exhibit the same coldness that is shown to everyone else. Lady Vengeance 
offers an alternative femininity, but one where motherhood is still sacred, and in effect, 
one that is not completely free of the bounds of Confucius patriarchy.  
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CONCLUSION 
Over the course of this thesis I have analyzed Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance, 
Oldboy, and Sympathy for Lady Vengeance and argued that the films are critiques on 
South Korean society with a focus on the last thirty years of history. Through textual and 
formal analyses I have identified that the films explicitly reference this history and then 
express this criticism through the main motif of violence and with it they explore a 
number of issues. Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance and Oldboy are mainly concerned with 
class issues yet approaches them in a different manner.  
Sympathy for Mr. Vengeance groups the working-class and the upper class alike, 
and conceives of a Korea where its citizens are all possible victims in the quest for 
economic growth. Oldboy does not share this view. While the main characters are still 
class-stratified the film presents the upper class character as the sole benefactor of the 
carnage. Both films are also concerned with issues of masculinity in relation to class 
positions. The protagonists of the film are able to transcend their class positions and in 
some cases attain another class position through acts of cruelty. But like the hope that 
was promised the Korean people throughout the 80’s and 90’s, this mobility is false, and 
dashed hope and ruin awaits them. Lady Vengeance is also preoccupied with gender 
issues, but with a focus on femininity. The conception of femininity is more complex 
than the trilogy’s handling of masculinity and the film makes a pointed critique on the 
place of women in contemporary Korea. The protagonist of Lady Vengeance is 
imprisoned because she is a woman, and therefore automatically situated beneath a man. 
Through the acquisition of violence, she is able to surpass her marginalized role of a 
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woman in Confucius Korea, and take her place as a mother. Lady Vengeance also 
introduces a new issue, one that is related to class and gender: education. Considered to 
be a tool that will lead to a better class position, education has become a social problem 
in Korea and Lady Vengeance considers this predicament. 
This study is far from over and the results are not entirely conclusive. One matter 
that I have set aside for this thesis is historical reception. It is my assertion that the 
varying degrees of domestic success of Park’s films are connected to the extent to which 
spectators were engaging with the commentary. In other words, in a mainstream film 
culture where romantic comedies and melodramas are by far the norm, I believe that the 
biting social commentary is a large reason why some of Park’s films have been 
neglected. In order to prove or disprove this, I plan on looking at historical mainstream 
South Korean reviews as well as responses on popular Korean internet forums. The 
Vengeance Trilogy had its share of proponents and critics and I intend to look at what 
audiences responded to and what they found deplorable. I refuse to assume that most of 
the criticism is simply about the films’ ultraviolence and taboo themes; underneath the 
criticism, and tied to the film’s stylistic violence, are political ideas and social positions.  
Reversely, I also keep in mind the fact that historical Korean audiences did enjoy 
the films. Subsequently, it is important to research the films’ core audiences and what 
aspects of the film those audiences engaged with. This can in turn give some insight as to 
whether the alternative nationalism constructed in the Vengeance Trilogy explicitly or 
implicitly connected with audiences. 
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The Vengeance Trilogy fits in this schema of violence as social commentary, but 
they are not Park’s only films. Park has six more feature-length films, including the 
aforementioned J.S.A. and his recent Thirst (Bakjwi)(2009). On first glance, not all of 
Park’s films seem to be social critiques, and not all of them feature graphic violence. 
However, I do believe that to varying degrees, Park’s other works also share a number of 
affinities with the films of the Vengeance Trilogy. Of particular interest is Thirst, the 
story of a Catholic priest who is transformed into a vampire. Not only does Thirst feature 
copious amounts of blood, it also shares striking similarities to Sympathy and Oldboy on 
a reception level. This is because Thirst was domestically unsuccessful, but was awarded 
the Jury Prize at the 2009 Cannes Film Festival (Shin “For Better”). Was the film’s 
bloodshed and excessive sexuality too excessive for Korean audiences? Or was it that the 
social commentary was again too pointed, too close to home? Or perhaps it was a 
combination of both? 
While I intend to continue work on Park Chan-wook’s films, I do not limit the 
work to Park nor do I identify this strategy only in his work. Instead, this thesis serves as 
an entry point to a larger phenomenon and a larger study. Kim Ki-duk and Kim Ji-woon 
are two other mainstream Korean filmmakers who began work in the late 90’s, and like 
Park they too produce films centered on atrocity. In many aspects Kim Ki-duk is even 
more severe than either director, as his films play a large role in the conceptions of 
extremities in Korean cinema. The Isle (Seom)(2000), Address Unknown (Suchwin 
bulmyeong)(2001), Bad Guy (Nabbeun namja)(2001), and The Coast Guard (Hae 
anseon)(2002) are just a number of Kim’s films that fit the same criteria as Park’s films. 
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Likewise, Kim has The Quiet Family (Choyonghan kajok)(1998), A Tale of Two Sisters 
(Janghwa, Hongryeon)(2003), and A Bittersweet Life (Dalkomhan Insaeng)(2005). 
Incidentally, several of these films have been released through Tartan Asian Extreme or 
similar DVD distributors. 
What I am essentially beginning here is situating Park (and these other 
filmmakers) within the context of national cinema. In order to expound on this premise, I 
must first identify the national cinema that Park fits into. I must inspect the state of 
Korean cinema during the production of these films and categorize the defining 
characteristics. Then I will be able to designate how Park fits into this national cinema, 
whether his films are a main proponent, or part of a sub-movement. 
According to Stephen Crofts, national cinemas should be analyzed in terms of 
“production”, “audiences”, “discourses”, “textuality”, “national-cultural specificity”, “the 
cultural specificity of genres and nation-state cinema movements”, “the role of the state” 
and “the global range of nation-state cinemas” in order to identify what type of films 
constitute national cinemas and how national cinemas lean towards certain tendencies 
(qtd. in Hjort 3-4). I have begun situating these films within discourses of nationalism but 
even that work is far from complete. I begin with an inspection of three films in hopes 
that they will give me an entry to the larger context, and I hope that the larger context 
will then give me more insight to the individual films. 
Mette Hjort and Scott Mackenzie contend that national cinema is a multifaceted 
and complex issue, and that any study on the subject will be the same. However, they do 
argue that national cinema is best understood “in terms of conflict” and that “films do not 
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simply represent or express the stable features of a national culture, but are themselves 
one of the loci of debates about a nation’s governing principles, goals, heritage and 
history” (4). This thesis has found that this is certainly the case with the Vengeance 
Trilogy. These films are part of a national cinema and do not simply reflect the values 
and ideas of South Korea. Instead they serve as a site where discussion and debate can be 
held. 
One starting point for this study and my assessment of the film’s imagining of 
nation is Benedict Anderson’s work. In relation to Anderson’s notions of the “imagined 
community” Andrew Higgson notes the transnational implications of the world today, 
and that the diasporic nature of some communities prevents from a complete imagined 
community and a national identity shared through a geographical space (65-66). Higgson 
continues along these lines, positing that national cinema are the “product of a tension 
between ‘home’ and ‘away’” and that national cinema “seems to look inward, reflecting 
on the nation itself” or “look out across its borders, asserting its difference from other 
national cinemas” (67). As far as the Vengeance Trilogy is concerned, these films are 
certainly looking inwards, reflecting on the society, culture, and history that they came 
from. At the same time, it is undeniable that the transnational imagination plays a 
significant role and these implications must also be considered. 
In his search for a more fluid use of national cinema, Andrew Higgson questions 
the validity of national cinema in the current world. He asks if it is legitimate and/or 
useful to consider national cinema. However, he does look to Stephen Croft’s contentions 
that “in some contexts it may be necessary to challenge the homogenizing myths of 
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national cinema discourse; in others, it may be necessary to support them (qtd. in 
Higgson 73). In the context of British national cinema, Higgson’s questioning of a 
homogenous national cinema may be valid, but in the context of South Korea, I believe it 
is necessary to support a reading of a consistent national cinema. While films produced in 
South Korea may not be completely uniform, there are strong affinities in a good number 
of them that must be addressed. 
Finally, in order to accurately work out these films’ positions in Korean national 
cinema, I must further develop my use of ultraviolence. The most pressing task that I 
have is to first decide whether I am going to pick up the undertaking that Prince has left 
unfinished (and that I have left neglected): a working definition of the term ultraviolence. 
I must decide whether or not ultraviolence needs actual definition, whether it is a mode 
that is substantial enough to be specifically differentiated from general cinema violence. 
The alternative is that the current use in mainstream culture, that of anything that is 
higher in degree than what is considered to be “normal” media violence. However this is 
a precarious issue when one considers the historical increase in media violence. What 
was once considered gratuitous barely incites a reaction in a contemporary viewer. 
These films and this thesis are about Korea. South Korea is a nation that has gone 
through incredibly rapid change in the 20th century. Once a war-ravaged nation rife with 
poverty, it is now one of the 30 nations of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) and classified as a “High-income OECD member” (“Data”). 
In their book Korea’s Economic Miracle Charles Harvie and Lee Hyun-hoon note: 
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 Few countries have attained such a high level of development so rapidly.  
  In a single generation this poor nation, which had consisted primarily of  
  subsistence farmers in the 1950s and early 1960s, had become the world’s  
  largest producer of home appliances, the second largest producer of semi- 
  conductors, the second largest shipbuilder, the fifth largest car maker, the  
  eleventh largest economy and the twelfth largest trading nation. … The  
  country’s attainment of OECD membership in December 1996 reflected  
  35 years of extraordinary growth and marked the economy’s coming of  
  age. For many developing countries Korea’s economic development  
  model – state-directed capitalism – appeared to offer a viable framework  
  for their own development programmes (2). 
It is undeniable that South Korea has come a long way. However, while Harvie 
and Lee give an accurate account of the nation’s economic development, they fail to 
represent what cannot be seen in the statistics: the high cost. Internationally and 
domestically, many may see Korea as a booming economy and a model for economic 
development. But despite those substantial advances, there are just as many who do not 
share that same view. They perceive not the progress, but the lack of progress and the 
inequity that persists in the nation. Contrary to popular nationalism that only tout how far 
the country has come, the films of the Vengeance Trilogy gives representation to those 
that have been neglected. South Korea has come a long way, but it has just as much a 
long way to go. 
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This thesis originally began with my observation of the substantial amount of 
violence in Park Chan-wook’s Vengeance Trilogy and the high degree of intensity of that 
violence. As I progressed in my analysis of the violence and began recognizing the 
dominant themes to the films, I discovered that the films had prominent themes that were 
reaching to contemporary social issues. These issues were inseparably connected to the 
brutality and seemed to fuel it. These films are just three works amidst a booming 
industry. However, they are also three films that represent a growing trend within that 
industry that specifically point out to a larger context, and also have a considerable role in 
transnational flow; they are simultaneously about Korea and reaching beyond Korea. By 
looking at these films and beyond them, we are offered valuable insight as to how the 
medium of cinema plays a role in discourses revolving around the nation. Through these 
films, we are able to observe one way in how a nation sees itself. It is not an ideal image, 
nor is it the prevalently accepted image, but it is no longer a hidden image. It is there to 
be viewed, neglected, championed, attacked, and analyzed.  
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